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11. Perceptual Experiential Content: Setting the Context and Defining Terms
1.1 The thesis stated
My thesis is broadly construed this way: intentionalism, as a theory about 
perceptual experience, says that the intentional character of perceptual 
experience determines the phenomenological character of that experience.  In 
some way, yet to be explained, phenomenology is determined by intentional 
content.  It will take some work to unravel this notion and the corresponding 
implications.  After I have done this I will show that intentionalism fails on two 
accounts.  It fails to replace the sense-data theory as an explanation of the 
content of perceptual experience.  I will show this to be one of its primary 
motivations.  It also fails to deal satisfactorily with the problem of perceptual 
illusion.  I will then offer an alternative rooted in the perceptual theory of Charles 
Peirce.  I believe his critical but common sense approach preserves the intuition 
of sense-data theory, that perception is primarily a relation between perceivers 
and objects. Peirce’s theory also provides a better solution to the problem of 
illusion.  
I will give a whole chapter over to exploring the meaning of this notion of 
intentionalism about perceptual experience.  I think the effort will be worthwhile.  
Fields of philosophy like perception have become highly specialized.  Even 
though terms like content, intentionality, and phenomenology are common 
buzzwords, it is far too easy to use these concepts without specifying exactly 
what is meant.  I want to gain as much terminological clarity as possible.
21.2 The arguments summarized
The argument of this thesis will follow this route: First, I will spend some 
time developing the major moves of the intentionalist theory with the purpose of 
clearly stating what I take to be the crux of the argument for intentionalism of 
either a conceptualist or nonconceptualist bent.1  This will involve some 
description but should provide a context for my arguments that follow.  As there 
are many participants I will select those who I take to play a predominant or 
representative role in the contemporary arguments for intentional content.  In my 
conclusion of this section I will set out the difficulties that stand in the way of 
dealing with the content of perceptual experience solely in intentionalist 
terminology.  I will then contend that intentionalism of either form is not justified in 
limiting its characterization of perceptual experience to intentional content.  
Neither is phenomenological content determined by nor identical with intentional 
content, at least not in any philosophically important sense.  No error on the part 
of early sense-data object-content approaches should result in the elimination of 
an object-content characterization.  This is what I will argue for.
I will first show this with an argument that there is simply no way to specify 
an intentional content with any single perceptual experience.  In other words, my 
argument will show that intentional content is too easy to claim but too hard to 
specify.  In fact nothing intrinsic to experience defines for us one certain way the 
world is represented as being.  Much of this will hang on just what is meant by 
representational content.  Representational content is used in a psychological 
                                           
1 See chapter 2 for a fuller treatment of these concepts.
3and epistemological sense.  The former is philosophically benign while the latter 
is interesting. Unfortunately it is also the latter use of representational content 
that fails on the intentionalist account.  I will show that it is simply not the role of 
the experience to define for the perceiver any single meaning contained in the 
experience.
Next, I argue that there is an intuitively appealing and explanatorily 
necessary causal story in perceptual experience that needs to be sustained if we 
are to take perceptual experience to be understandable at all.  At one level this is 
not much to ask of a theory of perception.  I take it that a causal requirement on 
the concept of perception is necessary but not sufficient for a successful theory 
of perception.  I will argue that the intentionalist formulation of the content view 
cannot sustain this account.  The loss of the causal requirement results in a loss 
of worldly content and worldly interaction at the perceptual level.    
Following that, I will argue that one of the central motivations for 
intentionalism about perceptual experience, namely the argument from cases of 
illusion, can be dealt with satisfactorily without the intentionalist theory.  I will first 
show how important intentionalism takes its resolution of the argument from 
cases of illusory experience to be, and then I show that intentionalists lose much 
of the impetus for their revision of the object-content view once the argument 
from illusion is satisfactorily dealt with in an alternative way.  
All of these main arguments come in chapter three.  For this reason 
chapter three is the crux of my thesis.  I will take these arguments to be 
significant enough to warrant a different description of perceptual experience.  I 
4will explore the basic framework developed by Charles Peirce at the beginning of 
the twentieth century as my guide for an articulation of a more satisfactory 
account of perceptual experience.  First, I will resolve a difficulty within the 
scholarly literature on Peirce’s theory of perception.  Peirce’s theory of the 
percept has been misunderstood and misinterpreted.  It is a difficult concept 
because Peirce was wrestling with the very heart of perceptual experience 
namely the status of the phenomenological content of perceptual experience, 
otherwise known as the percept or sense-data.  
After describing the view Peirce held, what I will call a “two-level view of 
perception” I will show why it is compelling, and why it should replace the 
currently influential intentionalist view. I will argue, following Peirce, that 
perceptual experience is silent in a philosophically significant way.  Our senses 
are silent.  Second, Peirce tells us that the closest philosophically interesting 
representational content in the vicinity of perceptual experience is perceptual 
judgment, which only serves as an index and not a full-blown genuine 
representation of some state of the world.  It serves the purpose of indexing, 
pointing, or identifying but not symbolically mediating.  After this I will argue why I 
think the primary motivation for intentionalism, the traditional problem of illusion 
and the seeming failure of sense-data theories, can be handled in such a way 
that does not lead to the intentionalist’s desired conclusion.
Last I will draw some conclusions about the current debate over the 
content of perceptual experience as a complete account of the nature of 
perceptual experience.
51.3 Sense data theory, intentionalism, and natural realism explained
Intentionalism is a reaction largely to the perceived failure of sense-data 
theories.  It rejects what it should preserve of the sense-data theory, namely that 
perceptual content is object-content, and retreats to various forms of intentional 
content.  There are several reasons for this that I will explore below. In order to 
preserve the correct intuition of the sense-data theory that perception is primarily 
a relation between perceiver and object and not a way of representing I will 
propose a version of naïve or natural realism about perceptual experience.2  It 
will help then to provide some context for how these theories arose.
The philosophy of perception and questions and problems raised therein 
are as old as philosophy itself.  The Presocratics were primarily concerned with 
the physiological basis of the senses.3  As is true with many philosophical 
questions real inquiry begins in Plato.  In the Theaetetus Plato has Socrates 
examine the hypothesis that perception is a reliable form of knowledge.  Here 
Plato separates the flux of sense perception from the more reliable knowledge 
through knowing Forms.4  Thus began the long tradition of distinguishing 
between the sensory appearance and the reality known through rational means.  
This division was exacerbated by the method of doubt employed by Descartes.  
Descartes’ method in Meditations on First Philosophy  was to doubt any 
faculty that was not completely trustworthy.  Repeatedly Descartes reminds his 
                                           
2 I will use natural realism for the name for this position instead of the traditionally used naïve 
realism.  I take the name from Putnam (1994: 454) who takes it from James (1912).  I do not like 
the term “naïve” because it contributes to the misunderstanding that the naïve realist is merely 
the common persons position and not a substantive theoretical position.
3 Hamlyn (1961: 8).
4 Plato (1989: 845-919). 
6reader of the mistake of trusting the senses for knowledge of objects in the 
world.5  His conclusion is that only through purely mental scrutiny can any object 
be known by the mind.  The senses are only capable of informing the mind of 
what is beneficial and harmful to itself.  Of their reliability for knowledge of objects 
in the world Descartes says, 
But I misuse them by treating them as reliable touchstones for 
immediate judgments about the essential nature of the bodies 
located outside us; yet this is an area where they provide only very 
obscure information.6
It is against this view of the senses that Locke initiates the roots of the 
contemporary sense-data view.  Locke posited “a new way of ideas” by which he 
rooted all knowledge in ideas of sense or reflection.  For Locke the ideas we 
have do represent objects in the world and are the links by which we know the 
external world.  The simple ideas of sense are literally the building blocks of our 
knowledge of the world.7  This theory of perception has come to be called indirect 
realism and specifically a representative theory about perception.  This theory 
was eventually to be instantiated by the sense-data theory put forth by Russell 
and Moore among others.  By moving directly to the twentieth century we skip 
over the attempt at synthesis by Kant and the Idealist reaction by Hegel and 
Fichte.  Since Moore and Russell react to this idealism by a return to empiricism, 
in a very real way, Locke’s Representative Realism is reborn in the sense-data 
                                           
5 It must be remembered though that Descartes did trust the senses to give good information 
about the state of the body under normal viewing conditions.  Descartes did not mistrust the 
senses near as much as some of his later interpreters, specifically Malebranche.
6 Descartes (1989: 59).
7 Locke (1961: II.ii.1).
7theory.  It is at that point that the contemporary debate that is the subject of this 
thesis begins.   
In the twentieth century the debate has focused on the nature of the 
content of perceptual experience.  But the debate looks very different at the end 
of the twentieth century than it did at the beginning.  The terms of the more 
recent debate over content are still being defined and yet it is already generating 
a rich range and diversity of perspectives.8  Historically, one trend has been to 
assimilate an account of perception to either sensation or judgment.  The 
sensational account deals well with the passive sensory aspect, while the 
judgmental account brings the concept closer to the active role that perception 
plays in gaining knowledge about the world.9  Commonly this is represented by 
the difference between perceiving aspects of an object and perceiving that such 
and such is the case, or perceiving a fact.  But it seems crucial to me that an 
either/or account will not suffice.  It is part of this present study to understand 
how a proper account of the knowledge derived from perception is dependent on 
an account of the nature of the objects of perception, which is better equated with 
the sensational aspect.
There are epistemic problems of perception that differ from the traditional 
problem of determining the nature of perceptual objects.  The traditional problem 
attempts to devise a theory that accounts for our ordinary conception of 
                                           
8 For an introduction into the field of the content of perception see Crane (ed.) (1992) especially 
Crane (chapter 1), Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) (2006) and Gunther (ed.) (2003).  Each of 
these collections contains a helpful introduction situating the debate about the content of 
perceptual experience within the broader framework of the philosophy of perception.
9 Hamlyn (1961) is an excellent historical account of philosophy of perception beginning with the 
Pre-Socratics and ending with the middle of the twentieth century.  This division of traditional 
accounts of perception into either sensation or judgment is his.
8perceptual experience and how to deal with the problem of illusion or 
hallucination.  The traditional theories such as sense-data and intentionalism as 
well as natural realism attempt to analyze perceptual experience and the 
possibilities of error from illusion or hallucination.  This question and its resolution 
are traditionally taken as separate from whether perceptual experience provides 
a subject with justified belief about the world.  In other words, whether one is a 
direct realist or an indirect realist is not supposed to immediately determine one’s 
answer to the epistemological problem of perception’s role in justification.  I think 
however that the two problems are closely related.10
There is a second problem that is commonly called the epistemological 
problem of perception.  The epistemological problem of perception asks how 
perceptual experience can be involved in justifying beliefs about the world.  While 
various theories about the nature of perception provide various answers to the 
epistemological problem, the latter should not be confused with the traditional 
problem.  Recently, these two questions about the nature of perceptual 
experience and its role in epistemic issues have been merging. It will be part of 
the aim of this thesis to ask whether the assimilation of sensation and judgment 
is the right response to problems in philosophy of perception.  Below I offer a 
short characterization of the sense-data theory, intentionalism and natural 
realism in order to show how they construe the primary terms of the debate.  
                                           
10 In other words if we could simply describe the relation between perceiver and object, as well as 
the nature of perceptual objects, we would progress a long way toward resolving the 
epistemological issue.
9The sense-data theory closely resembles the theories that arose out of 
modern philosophy.  Traditionally understood sense-data can be associated with 
Descartes’ and Locke’s ideas and Hume’s impressions.  They are thought of as 
mental objects that are the direct objects of experience.  In the sense-data theory 
the objects in the world are experienced indirectly via these intermediary objects.  
This preserves a strict distinction between appearance and reality, namely a 
substance distinction.  More contemporarily, the sense-data theory is associated 
with Russell (1912) and Moore (1993).  Moore holds up an envelope and then 
says, “Though we all did (as we should say) see the same envelope, no two of 
us, in all probability, saw exactly the same sense-data.”11  Here Moore draws the 
distinction between the seeing of a particular sense-datum and seeing a real 
object.  Moore then argues that none of the various sense-data had by any of the 
perceivers while seeing the envelope could be equated or identified with any 
particular part of the object.  His conclusion is this: “This seems to be the state of 
things with regard to these sense-data—the color, the size and the shape.  They 
seem, in a sense to have had very little to do with the real envelope, if there was 
a real envelope.”12
Russell (1912) makes a similar move in chapter one of The Problems of 
Philosophy.  He describes a scene of several people viewing a table.  Because 
each person’s position to the table is different, their sense-data are different.  The 
problematic question becomes how to bridge what is immediately known in 
                                           
11Moore (1993: 50).
12 Moore (1993: 56).
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sensation with some reality such as the physical table.  What is the link between 
these direct objects of perception and the mediately known external objects?  
To summarize the sense-data position I will say that the sense-data theory 
says that whenever something looks X there is some object O that looks X.  This 
O is called a sense-datum.  Perception is sensation of sense-data.  Sense-data 
are the organization of color, size and shape to the perceiver.  Critical to the 
argument for sense-data is that sensation presents the perceiver with knowledge 
of a kind—namely color, size, and shape.  Sense-data are mental objects that 
are directly perceived and which supposedly make the perceiver indirectly aware 
of the objects that cause the sense-data.  The difficulty is in proving that this is in 
fact the case.
The sense-data theory came under increasing fire for several good 
reasons.  Sense-data are mental and in a scientific environment increasingly 
interested in material or natural explanations sense-data posed problems to 
physical reduction.  Sense-data also posed difficult problems for knowledge of 
the world.  This criticism is usually construed by saying that sense-data, instead 
of revealing the world, create a “veil of perception”.  This criticism is similar to 
that of the modern empiricists, namely that the material world is never 
experienced directly and therefore our knowledge of sense-data only applies
indirectly, and possibly not at all, to worldly objects.
Intentionalism is a broad movement encompassing many views.  But I will 
limit my description to that which is common to the intentionalist camp broadly 
construed.  Brentano (1995) is the source of current theories of intentionality.  
11
Brentano thought that the most significant difference between the mental and 
physical was a feature he called intentional inexistence, sometimes described as 
the aboutness of the mental.  The key to this difference can be expressed with an 
example.  Non-intentional relations expressed by propositions of facts are only 
true if both relata exist.  For X to hit Y both X and Y must exist.  But in mental 
relations like desiring, believing, and imagining both relata need not exist.  I may 
believe or desire or imagine X without X having to exist.  X, in this case is an 
intentional object, an object that my mental states are about or directed toward.  I 
consider it an open question in what sense perception might be a mental state 
exhibiting this characteristic of intentionality.  The intentional theory of perception 
borrows this concept of intentionality and subsumes the concept of perception 
under the class of mental states.  Characteristic of these mental states is their 
propositional or representational content.  The content of the mental state is said 
to have correctness conditions, which depend on whether what the state is about 
is true, or not.  In other words, if a belief that x is f is true, x  must actually be f.  
Otherwise the content of the belief is false.  Not all mental states have 
correctness conditions, but it is asserted by the intentionalist that perception 
does.  
By understanding perception as an intentional state of a particular kind, 
the intentional theory claims that perceptions have correctness conditions that 
determine whether the perception is correct or incorrect.  This is very different 
from the sense-data theory that construed mental objects with phenomenological 
content, but not propositional correctness conditions. I will spend more time on 
12
the intentional theory below and so will refrain from further description and citing 
examples here.  But, what I will do is compare and contrast the intentional theory 
with the sense-data theory it is supposed to replace.13
For the sense-data theory, relation to objects, albeit mental objects, was 
primary.  This resulted in attention in perception being given primarily to the 
phenomenology of the perception but conceived under empiricist loyalties and 
not in the vein of Husserl.14  The intentional theory equates perception with 
intentionality and specifically representation.  I will show this by example below.  
A perception is equivalent to an intentional state.  For the intentionalist it is the 
representational content of this intentional state which is the content of 
perception, and further, it is the intentional content which determines whether an 
object is perceived or not.  Intentionalism, unlike the sense-data theory, which 
defends indirect perception, considers itself to be a theory of direct perception.  
When the intentional content is correct it is the real object that is seen; the 
perception is veridical.  In other words, for the intentionalist, the experience is a 
mental state characterized by intentional content. When the content is incorrect 
the perception is illusory or hallucinatory.  
I will defend a view held by Charles Peirce that is closer to the sense-data 
view of perceptual experience, but with some important qualifications.  For 
Peirce, perception is a two-level concept with emphasis on the relation to the 
object, rather than on the notion of correct representation.  Unlike the 
                                           
13 For examples of the idea that the intentional theory was a replacement for the sense-data 
theory see Anscombe (1981: 11-13).
14 For a classic contemporary defense and elaboration of the notion of the phenomenology of 
experience see Nagel (1974) “What is it like to be a bat?”
13
intentionalist Peirce held that a perceptual judgment followed the presentation of 
the object and not vice-versa.  Also, unlike the sense-data theory, Peirce’s 
perceptual content is not merely a mental entity, but an interaction between two 
existences, or self and non-self.  I take this view to be a natural realist theory of 
perception for several reasons.
  The natural realist usually appeals to common sense to explain 
perception.  The natural realist conceives of experience of the environment 
provided by the senses as lacking correctness conditions.  It simply is not a 
function of the senses to communicate accuracy or inaccuracy, and it is not the 
nature of the presentation of the environment in view to be accurate or 
inaccurate.  A judgment about the objects in view may have correctness 
conditions and therefore is a mental act, but this is to be distinguished from the 
phenomenological presentation of the environment that is object of the mental 
activity.  It is crucial to Peirce’s account and mine that we should maintain the 
metaphorical nature of the metaphor that the senses deceive us.  The 
intentionalist in some sense takes this literally while the natural realist preserves 
the metaphorical reading.  
In order to provide a context for the contemporary debate about the 
content of perceptual experience I will begin by discussing some of the primary 
terms that are used by the various views, albeit sometimes in very different ways.  
It should be noted that much research could be spent in each of these areas 
alone.  My purpose then will be to set some parameters by highlighting 
14
commonalities and distinctions important for my thesis instead of offering a 
comprehensive account of each term.
1.4 Some problematic terms
Perception itself is a contentious concept.  As I mentioned above in some 
theories it is limited to sensation and in others it includes judging.  How it is 
defined is heavily dependent on the theory of perception a philosopher employs.  
But, if construed broadly enough a general definition can be given.  Perception in 
the sense discussed by sense-datists, intentionalists, and natural realists is a 
concept that crucially involves the senses.  Perception is specifically a way of 
gaining information.  It is commonly thought that we can perceive both aspects of 
objects in view and facts.  Vision is often the sense of choice for perceptual 
theory both historically and in the contemporary literature.  It is also customary to 
claim that whatever is said about vision follows for the other senses.  While I lean 
in this direction I will refrain from generalizing in this thesis.  The philosophers 
and positions I interact with will all involve vision and so will my conclusions.  It 
will be enough to attempt to resolve some of the difficulties in vision without 
assuming justice is done to all of the senses.
Perception presupposes three things:  First, an entity capable of having 
the environment in view.  This capacity is made possible by the sensory system 
that makes feeling the world possible.  At its most fundamental level we might 
characterize this as an ability to be sensitive to impacts from the surrounding 
environment.  Second, an entity capable of performing actions such as focusing 
on some part of the view, which entails the ability to respond to certain features 
15
of the environment in view.  Last, perception presupposes a capacity to 
assimilate or understand what the system, in this case human, is responding to.   
So far, I take none of this to be controversial within the theories I discuss.  In 
other words I think most theories of perception attempt to accommodate our 
common sense notion of perceiving.  What gets tricky is how to flesh out these 
characteristics in an account of the experience of perceiving.  I am laying the 
groundwork for a criticism of intentionalism about perceptual experience in order 
to understand the deficiencies of the view.  My point so far is to say that an 
account of perception or of the content of perception must be able to make sense 
of these characteristics.  If an entity lacks the proper instruments for feeling or 
sensing the environment, perception will not be possible.  Also if the entity has 
the instruments to view but lacks the instruments to act in response to features of 
the environment or lacks the capacity to recognize correct or incorrect 
responses, then it is not able to perceive.  But I think these characteristics of 
perceiving are broad enough to include non-human perceivers.  Further definition 
would certainly make this a contentious point.  Is perception conceptual?  If so it 
could be argued that it is only humans, and more specifically those who have 
concepts, that can perceive.  
What does it mean to talk about perceptual experience?  This gets us 
closer to our point of contention.  For one might legitimately ask how we should 
characterize the content of perceptual experience?  It has been argued that 
reflecting on experience inevitably involves reflecting on the scene in view.  This 
is a way of pointing out what is often called the transparency of experience.  The 
16
transparency of experience is tough for the sense-data theory to accommodate 
and yet it seems very intuitive.  But another type of content resists the 
transparency idea; this content is known as the representational content of 
perceptual experience.  It is this content, elaborated on below, that intentionalists 
have argued is the true content of perceptual experience.
1.4.1. Content  
The content of a perceptual experience can be understood in very 
different ways.  In one sense of content one might speak of the content of a 
treasure chest.  This might also be closer to characterizing the view one has 
when perceiving.  A characterization of this content of perceptual experience is 
closely linked with the sense-data theory about perceptual experience.  On the 
object-content view one would describe the experience by describing the view of 
the immediate object that lies open to one.  
The other way of characterizing the content of an experience, which we 
will see has been largely a reaction to the failure of the treasure chest content 
view described above, is by a description of what the experience represents 
informationally.  The information content is also the intentional content of the 
experience.  It is what the experience is a description of what the perception is 
about.  In this sense the content correctly or incorrectly represents some way the 
world is.  In this case perception is understood as a propositional attitude, an 
attitude one can take toward propositions.  They are supposed to be the content 
of the perception.  So, if one can take a believing attitude toward that p one can 
17
also take a desiring, expecting or perceiving attitude or so the intentionalist would 
have us believe.
McDowell defines content in its contemporary meaning as “what is given 
by a ‘that’ clause.”15 In this sense a proposition such as “I see that p” (where p
represents any proposition such as “The cat is on the mat.”) gives the content of 
the perceptual experience.  Key to this type of account of perceptual experience 
is that it involves representational content and therefore correctness conditions.  
It is a central part of my thesis that perception in fact is an attitude that does not 
involve representational content or correctness conditions. It lacks some critical 
characteristics of significant representation.
Without reviewing a remotely complete recent history of the theory of 
perception one can see an important transition in thinking about the mental that 
has led to our current dispute over the content of perception.  Early and mid-
twentieth century theory of perception was dominated by sense-data theory and 
phenomenalism. Both of these theories took perceptual experience to involve 
object-contents.  They were prone to idealistic and subjectivist readings. Indirect 
theories of perception such as sense-data theories provided an explanation for 
the traditional problems of illusion and hallucination (they shared an object 
content with veridical perception).  But they failed to provide the kind of contact 
with the world that could lead to justified knowledge (i.e. the “veil of perception”) 
and resisted physical reduction. The successor to subjectivist versions of 
perception was the intentional theory of perception that had the advantage of 
                                           
15 McDowell (1996: 3).
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being realist about belief in the external world and so claimed to avoid the “veil of 
perception” problem.  The intentional theory remains very influential and provides 
a neat solution to the problem of illusion.  We have illusions because the 
immediate content of perceptual experience is intentional, it is about objects in 
the world.  The objects represented by the content may or may not actually be 
there. 
Crane introduces the contemporary debate over content in a different 
way.16  One notion of content arose out of the question of meaning in the 
philosophy of language in trying to understand how language represents.  The 
other notion of content comes from cognitive science, which has developed 
computational and information-processing models of the mental.  Different uses 
of some of the key terms by the different communities have made for some 
terminological confusion.  I will not focus on the cognitive science use of 
representation.  Whatever is true about representational states in cognitive 
science will be verified empirically.  When philosophers state that perceptual 
experience represents the world to be a certain way they are making a very 
substantial philosophical claim about the content and role of perceptual 
experience.  This is my focus.
Strawson (2005) has noted the often confusing ways that notions such as 
representation, sensation, and content are used in contemporary talk about 
experience.  My purpose in this study will not be to completely clear up the 
terminological muddle, which would take a totally different turn, but to state what 
                                           
16 Crane (1992: 6).
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are some conditions that need to be considered for these terms to have the 
minimal and basic use that they do.  So, let it be understood that by the content 
of perceptual experience the intentionalist generally means the representing of 
the world to be a certain way.
1.4.2. Nonconceptual content
Within the debate about the content of perceptual experience, concepts 
are generally understood as Fregean senses.  In the Fregean vein, the sense is 
the thought or proposition that a statement is about and is constituted by 
concepts.  Also, sense determines reference.  Concepts are also closely related 
to language use and such conceptual mental states as beliefs.  One easy way to 
distinguish conceptual content from nonconceptual content is to say that 
nonconceptual content is whatever conceptual content is not.  But this only gives 
us a negative definition.  Part of the exploration in the following chapters is to 
uncover just what nonconceptual content might be.
In this sense the content of an experience that is nonconceptual is one 
that is individuated not by Fregean criteria of difference in sense or by conceptual 
capacity at all.  In fact, the nonconceptual content of perceptual experience just is 
supposed to be the content of the experience that, while being specified or 
described by concepts, is not determined by concept possession.  But one 
difficulty the nonconceptualist runs into is how to specify an informational content 
that is not organized conceptually.
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1.4.3. Object
An object can also mean very different things in different theories of 
perception.  On the sense-data theory there are two objects. One object is 
mental, phenomenal, and immediate.  The second object is known indirectly and 
represented by the first object.  There is the real object that is supposed to be the 
cause of the sense-datum that one perceives.  This real object is thought of as a 
physical object, a part of the world.  On the intentional theory of perception an 
object is that which is intended or represented by the intentional content.  If it 
seems to me that I perceive that a car is there, then the intentional object of my 
perception is a state of affairs that a car is there.  This intentional object may or 
may not turn out to exist.  That is the beauty of intentionality in perception: like 
belief, it may miss its intended mark.  This intentional object is not phenomenal or 




2.1. The roots of intentionalism
It will help to begin with a more thorough look at the roots and current form 
of intentionalism.  The theory has its roots in Anscombe (1965), Armstrong 
(1968), Dretske (1969), and Searle (1983) and it is only in these writings that one 
can detect any indication of why the move away from a sense-data theory or 
natural-realism is made.  It is common today for an intentionalist about 
perceptual experience (henceforth an intentionalist17) to assume this theory of 
perception from the outset.  It is rarely argued for.  Take these more recent 
examples:
A perceptual experience represents the world as being a certain 
way…The representational content of experience is a many-
splendoured thing (Peacocke 1992: 105).
That things are thus and so is the content of the experience… 
(McDowell 1994: 26).
Our experience of the world has content—that is, it represents 
things as being in a certain way.  In particular, perceptual 
experience represents a perceiver as in a particular environment, 
for example, as facing a tree with brown bark and green leaves 
fluttering in a slight breeze (Harman 1990: 34).
It should be emphasized that the content of a perceptual 
experience specifies the way the world appears or seems to the 
subject (Byrne 2001: 201).18
                                           
17 There are intentionalists about many mental phenomena.  In this thesis an intentionalist is 
someone who places perception among phenomena that exhibit intentionality.  I am not targeting, 
nor do I want to, the broad Brentano Thesis that the main characteristic of mentality is 
intentionality, but only that perception does not qualify as a mental phenomena of this type.
18 I of course have not provided the context of these quotes which could provide extensive 
argumentation for this thesis.  But, a quick glance at any of these papers will I think show that the
thesis that experience has representational content is assumed from the outset.
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These more recent formulations make clear that the kind of representation 
intended is significant representation, personally recognizable as such, and it 
plays a crucial role in fixing meaning. Let me return then to some earlier 
formulations of the intentionality of perceptual experience in order to try and 
elucidate a motivation for it.
Anscombe (1965) explains that the sense-data theory and the natural 
theory of perception both fail by neglecting the intentionality of sensation.19  She 
lists ten examples of abnormal sensory experience of various degrees of illusion 
or hallucination.  Her conclusion from the examples is this: “Now ‘ordinary 
language’ views and ‘sense-datum’ views make the same mistake, that of failing 
to recognize the intentionality of sensation, though they take opposite positions in 
consequence.”20 What I want to emphasize is that perceptual illusion, the 
traditional problem of philosophy of perception, is a major component in her 
argument that sensation is intentional.
Armstrong (1968) articulates a “belief theory” about perceptual 
experience.  He says, “In the first stage, it is argued that an account of perception 
can be given in terms of the acquiring of beliefs about the physical world.  Many 
of the traditional problems of the philosophy of perception can be solved at this 
stage.”21  He goes on to say this: “Perceptual experience, as opposed to mere 
perception, is simply this flow in so far as we are conscious of it… The content of 
our perceptions, which so many philosophers want to turn into a non-physical 
                                           
19 Anscombe (1965: 11-13).
20 Anscombe (1965: 13).
21 Armstrong (1968: 208).
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object, is simply the content of the beliefs involved.”22  Finally, after discussing 
some examples of perceptual illusion Armstrong offers this solution: 
But if we conceive of perception as nothing but the acquiring of true 
and false beliefs about the current state of the perceiver’s body and 
environment, or of mental events that resemble the acquiring of 
such beliefs, an extraordinarily simple and natural dissolution of the 
problem is possible (Armstrong 1968: 242).
Even though the belief theory of Armstrong is different in many ways from that of 
Anscombe’s, the motivation is similar.  Intentional content is ushered in to solve 
the traditional problem of illusion and hallucination.  
Finally, I will mention Searle (1983) who articulates a similar motivation.  
Searle says this:
Internal to each phenomenon [belief and visual experience] is an 
Intentional content that determines its conditions of satisfaction.  
The argument that visual experiences are intrinsically Intentional, in 
sum, is that they have conditions of satisfaction which are 
determined by the content of the experience in exactly the same 
sense that other Intentional states have conditions of satisfaction 
which are determined by the content of the states (Searle 1983: 
40).
Searle states explicitly why he thinks experiences have intentional content, 
namely because they have conditions of satisfaction.  He goes on to explain that 
this content is propositional in the sense that it requires a whole state of affairs, a 
fact, to be seen.  An example is seeing that p or that such and such is the case.  
Searle goes on to explain how the intentional content provides the specification 
of the conditions of satisfaction for a perceptual experience to be “veridical.”
My conclusion then is this: That one of the central motivations of the 
intentionalist theory of perception, or the idea that perceptual experience has 
                                           
22 Armstrong (1968: 226).
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content, is the traditional problem of illusion and hallucination.  Early forms of the 
theory represented by the three philosophers above sought to solve one of the 
central problems of perception by claiming that the concept of perception should 
be associated or defined primarily, and sometimes solely, by its intentional 
content.  The intentional content is supposed to specify the correctness 
conditions for a particular perceptual experience to be true/false or veridical/non-
veridical.  
From this specification another primary tenet of intentionalism about 
perceptual experience may be drawn out.  The thesis that perceptual experience 
has correctness conditions expressed by a propositional content is central to 
intentionalism.  One way of putting this thesis is to convert the metaphor that our 
senses deceive us into a literal truth.  The intentionalist wants us to understand 
perceptual experience, say visual, as a process whereby our senses, say eyes, 
take in information in the environment which is represented by a propositional 
content that specifies the conditions for success in perception.  
Below I will argue why perceptual experience is not to be described by any 
intentional content in so far as intentional means representational.  Even if the 
motivation was warranted, which I will also argue against, the thesis is false.  
Perceptual experience is not representational even if it is mental and therefore in 
some sense intentional.  I will argue, following Peirce, that perceptual experience 
is silent.  Our senses are silent.  Second, Peirce tells us that the closest 
propositional content in the vicinity of perceptual experience is perceptual 
judgment, which only serves as an index and not a full-blown representation of 
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some state of the world.  It serves the purpose of indexing, pointing, or identifying 
but not fully representing.  After this I will argue why I think the primary motivation 
for intentionalism, the traditional problem of illusion and the seeming failure of 
sense-data theories, can be handled in such a way that does not lead to the 
intentionalist’s desired conclusion.  But first I take an aside.  There is a growing 
body of literature within the intentionalist framework about the kind of 
representational content perceptual experience has.  Specifically, McDowell’s 
Mind and World has received much attention, both negative and positive.  But, in 
the end I don’t think that anything hinges on the distinction made within this 
debate.  So, after some elaboration I will deal with the broader thesis shared by 
both parties of the dispute over the status of the content of perceptual 
experience, namely the very idea that a particular perceptual experience can be 
successfully identified with a propositional content that provides its correctness 
conditions. 
2.2. McDowell: A conceptualist version of intentionalism23
McDowell (1996) has articulated an enormously intriguing challenge to our 
standard conception of the link between mind and world.  It will be helpful to label 
the challenge conceptualism about perceptual experience (or conceptualism for 
short).24  The challenge begins with a common sense idea, namely, that we take 
our beliefs to be answerable to the world.25  Beliefs about the world have 
                                           
23 For other defenses of conceptual content see Sedivy (1996) and Brewer (1999) (although see 
Brewer (forthcoming) for a different view on the matter).
24 This is not the only theory that goes by the title of conceptualism.  There is another theory 
about the status of abstracta, one of which is conceptualism as opposed to realism or
nominalism.  Here I will use conceptualism to name the thesis that the content of perceptual 
experience is solely conceptual.
25 This is commonly understood as the correspondence theory of truth.
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correctness conditions or truth conditions whose value depends on how the world 
actually is.26  A belief is false which does not represent the world correctly.  A 
belief is true which does represent the world correctly.  Thinking is in some way 
answerable to the world.  The question becomes how one defines belief and 
world.  Problems arise according to various definitions.  
A very central notion for McDowell, which he picks up from Sellars, is that 
there are two spaces, traditionally named the normative and descriptive, and 
renamed by Sellars as the space of reasons and realm of law. The normative 
space or space of reasons is identical with the space of concepts for McDowell.  
Whatever falls within the space of reasons must also fall within the space of 
concepts.  The reason this distinction is important for McDowell is that it 
preserves a nonreductive account of knowing.  Sellars says:
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as 
that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that 
episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, 
of justifying and being able to justify what one says (Sellars 1997: 
76).
McDowell (1998) criticizes Sellars for transgressing the master thought of 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind by stepping over the demarcation line in 
Science and Metaphysics.  Above the line is the space of reasons, which is 
where justification takes place.  Below the line is the descriptive space filled by 
the empirical sciences in McDowell’s theory.  If descriptions of sensory systems 
making impingements on consciousness are below the line then it cannot be a
                                           
26 I use correctness conditions here because that is the term used in theories of the content of 
perception.  “Correctness conditions” came in to play because philosophers were uncomfortable 
using truth, which is normally a semantic property, for mental events like perception.  A similar 
terminological innovation occurs with veridical/nonveridical.  Essentially this means true or false.
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source of justification for beliefs about the world.  McDowell wants to preserve 
Sellars’ original thought that only reasons can justify and reasons are conceptual, 
therefore nothing that is nonconceptual can be a reason for belief.  This sounds 
like a version of Coherentism whereby only a belief can justify another belief.27  
But, McDowell makes some important qualifications that I articulate below.
McDowell’s next move is to set the stage by describing an oscillation 
between two ways of conceiving how justification is achieved.  He charges Evans 
(1982) with falling into the Sellarsian trap of the myth of the given.  Evans is 
charged with holding such a view, because he views perceptual experience as 
both nonconceptual and playing a justificatory role in knowledge. The myth is 
taken from Sellars’ attack on correspondentism in Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind.  The fundamental error of the myth so conceived is that  “the space of 
reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the 
conceptual sphere.  The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to 
allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of 
thought.”28  The problem with reasons considered as extra-conceptual, according 
to McDowell is that they are not structured in the right way to do what they are 
supposed to do.  They provide exculpations where we want justification.29  When 
we want reasons the myth offers us non-reasons.  The alternative view in the 
oscillation, on McDowell’s account, is Davidson’s Coherentism.  Coherentism 
cuts out the reliance on the world for justification and seeks justification only
                                           
27 See for instance Davidson (1986) “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”.
28 McDowell (1996: 7).
29 McDowell (1996: 8).
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 among other beliefs.  But, this, while it makes a type of real justification possible, 
renounces a central piece of the intuition, that experience provides rational 
constraint on our thinking about the world.30
What is common to both views is their conception of experience with the 
world.  Both views conceive of experience as nonconceptual.  Whereas that 
conception of experience provides justification by recourse to a given in Evans' 
case it is excluded from justification in Davidson’s case.  Either way experience is 
relegated to a causal role in both cases.31  It seems now that we can summarize 
McDowell’s argument this way:
P1: Perceptual experience provides reasons for belief about the world.
P2: Reasons are by their nature conceptual.
C: Perceptual experience is conceptual.
                                           
30 McDowell (1996: 18).
31 A chart might make this clearer.
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What is a paradigm case of McDowell’s conception of perceptual 
experience?  In McDowell’s case, what justifies a belief that p is the perceptual 
experience that p.  To experience the world as that p means nothing less than 
having the conceptual repertoire that usually works in spontaneous acts of 
judgment also available in a passive role to the sensory experiencing of the 
world. In other words when I judge p because I see p this is possible because 
perception is conceptually structured.  If perception were not conceptually 
structured then it could not play the role of justifying a judgment.  In this way 
McDowell says we are saddled with content (conceptual).  McDowell has 
received criticism for purporting that experience comes with subtitles.32  But he is 
clear that this is not his intention.  What he means is to understand conceptual 
structure as instantiated both linguistically and sensorily.  By understanding 
conceptual structure this way he provides an account of how experiences can 
provide justifications for beliefsnamely because they are of the same kind or 
structure.
McDowell’s characterization of perceptual experience, then, like the 
intentionalist’s, is that perceptual experience is exhausted by intentional content.  
The content of perceptual experience, he says, is conceptual.  This is 
controversial because it seems common sense that while descriptions of one’s 
perceptual experience may depend on conceptual capacities the actual 
perceptual experience does not, or at least not wholly.  But, given McDowell’s 
use of demonstrative reference, or that clauses, he argues that any aspect of 
                                           
32 Collins (1998).
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perceptual experience can be taken in this way, as a reason, and indeed if it is 
perceptual experience it is.  
Let me summarize then where I understand McDowell to be.  McDowell’s 
theory, broadly Kantian, is a two-factor view.  It is a view that perception is a 
conceptual affair.  There is no perceptual experience to speak of that is not 
conceptual.  What makes it a two-factor theory is that one cannot separate the 
sensory and conceptual components.  They are intertwined.  McDowell is 
concerned with the explanatory and justificatory aspect of experience on thought 
and action.  He pushes his theory about perceptual experience with this 
motivation.  His central point is to explain how a perceptual experience can be a 
reason for belief that p.  His answer is that only conceptual content can be a 
reason for another conceptual content.  Therefore, we must come to understand 
mature human experience of the world as conceptually structured.  But McDowell 
does not mean that sensory experience is later conceptually structured; he 
means to say that our sensory capacity is conceptually influenced all the way out 
to the world.  In other words there is no pure given ever.  Once we understand 
that our perceiving that p (i.e. perceiving a fact) is what justifies our belief that p, 
on McDowell’s account, we can understand how experience justifies belief about 
the world.  McDowell is clear that only the conceptual content of perceptual 
experience justifies belief.  It is in this sense that he is at odds with the 
nonconceptualists about perceptual experience.  But it is also in this sense that 
he is firmly within the intentionalist’s camp about the nature of perceptual 
experience.  It is exhausted by its intentional content.  McDowell conceives of 
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perceptual experience as giving reasons for belief.  He takes perceptual 
experience to have a content, available to the subject, that represents the way 
the world is.  
What is new and interesting in McDowell’s work is how honestly he allows 
his epistemological motivation to influence his theory of perception.  He carries it 
to its logical conclusions even where it may seem strange.  But I think it is this 
motivation that leads McDowell astray.  As I will discuss below it is the very idea 
that the experience of the world provides the perceiver with some unique and 
fixed representational content, conceptual in McDowell’s case, that is the 
mistake.
I want to raise a concern here that I will take to be significant for 
intentionalism as a whole.  McDowell is largely silent about theories of perception 
arising from cognitive science or psychology.  Largely he appears comfortable to 
leave theories of cognitive science to science and dismiss their relevance by 
placing them “below the line” as far as having epistemological import.  But it is 
my contention that McDowell’s account is lacking, as I believe other 
intentionalists’ accounts are, in not paying attention to the import of contemporary 
representational theory of perceptual informational processing.  McDowell holds 
that the object of perceptual experience is an intentional object, a Fregean 
sense, or a fact.  But I will argue below that this theory of perceptual objects 
cannot solve problems that arise for the intentionalists about the nature of 
perceptual experience and its explanatory value.  It is McDowell’s rejection of a
real phenomenological object-content, along with his acceptance of a robust 
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representational content that prevents his theory of perceptual experience from 
having the import it claims.  If McDowell’s concept of perceptual experience fails, 
then so does his attempt to preserve the empirical claim that experience of the 
world provides rational constraint on thought.
2.3. Evans and Peacocke: Nonconceptualist intentionalism
2.3.1. Evans on nonconceptual content
Evans (1982) is generally cited as the source of the notion of 
nonconceptual content in perceptual experience.  He is also one of McDowell’s 
(1996) targets and so it will be helpful to begin my analysis with his construal.  
Evans (1982) has as its major theme a “comprehensive investigation of 
the phenomenon of reference”.33  A theory of reference asks how a linguistic 
expression denotes one or more objects in the world.  Evans adheres, in spite of 
the backlash to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, to “Russell’s Principle” which 
says, “a subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he knows 
which object his judgment is about.”34  This is a way of saying that in order for a 
judgment about an object to be justified the subject must have a “discriminating 
knowledge” that enables her to pick that object out, or refer to it.  One of the 
conditions for discriminating an object, intuitively on Evan’s account, is to 
perceive the object.  It is within his defense of Russell’s Principle that Evans 
elucidates an initial theory of nonconceptual content.35  For Evans there is a level
                                           
33 Evans (1982: 3).
34 Evans (1982: 89).
35 For a fuller account of Evan’s theory of nonconceptual content please see chapters 5, 6.3 and 
7.4 of (Evans 1982).  I will be summarizing from these chapters in order to extract what is 
essential to his theory.
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of information, or knowledge, that is nonconceptual content, that grounds 
conceptual content.  His system resembles Russell’s division between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.  There are important 
differences but the purpose is similar.  Evans, like Russell, attempts to ground 
conceptual knowledge to something more basic, nonconceptual knowledge.  On 
this understanding it is easy to see why McDowell charges Evans with holding a 
version of the myth of the given.  The given is the workings of the nonconceptual 
systems that provide a grounding or foundation for the conceptual system.36
In Evans’ sense there is a nonconceptual but contentful state of the 
subject that grounds the conceptual states of the subject.  The informational 
(sensory) system takes in information about the environment that constrains the 
concepts applied when judging something to be true.  He draws a distinction 
between two kinds of information: sensory or nonconceptual and testimonial or 
conceptual.  The first involves perceptual experience and the second involves 
communication.  He takes it as fundamental that perceiving is receiving and 
communicating is transmitting information.37  What is crucial for our discussion is 
how to understand knowledge, because in informational theories information is 
substituted for knowledge, as both representational and nonconceptual.  
The question that Evans purports to answer is how perception makes a 
thought possible.  His answer is that perception is at a level of nonconceptual 
content that controls or constrains the conceptual content of our perceptual 
                                           
36 Evans (1982: 158, 160).
37 Evans (1982: 122).
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judgments.  And, just for clarity, Evans is speaking of informational content, not 
object-content.  
There are two criteria that make demonstrative reference possible for 
Evans:  First, there must exist an informational link between the subject and the 
object.  Second, the subject must have the ability to locate the object in space.38  
Let us explore both of these criteria for demonstrative reference.
Evans situates perception, communication, and memory within an 
informational system that “constitutes the substratum of our cognitive lives.”39  
When someone perceives, they are in an informational state with a 
nonconceptual content.  The information contained in the state is from the object.  
This information is nonconceptual information “about the states and doings of the 
object over a period of time.”40  But this information link is not enough to 
guarantee demonstrative identification.  
Besides an information link between the subject and object, Evans posits 
the ability to locate the object in space in order to have identification conditions 
free of a conceptual element.  Evans calls this egocentric spatial thinking or here 
thought.  Examples of here thought are  “It’s F over there”, “It’s F up there to the 
left”, “It’s F a bit behind me”.41  All of these thoughts are dependent on a cognitive 
map that locates a person egocentrically.  Evans stresses that it is this cognitive 
map that makes egocentric thought about the spatiotemporal world objective.42  
                                           
38 Evans (1982: 170).
39 Evans (1982: 122).
40 Evans (1982: 144).
41 Evans (1982: 153).
42 Evans (1982: 152).
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Hearing something from over there is a case of the nonconceptual informational 
content that we rely on for conceptual thought.  This is as far as Evans gets in 
defining a level of nonconceptual content.
In summary then, the combination of an informational link with egocentric 
spatial thinking is the nonconceptual content of experience that provides 
grounding for demonstrative reference.  It is not clear whether Evans intends the 
information link to be personal or subpersonal.43  But, it seems that it is best 
construed at a subpersonal level of cognitive activity.  For this reason I will 
concentrate on understanding Evans’ egocentric spatial thinking. Evans is clear 
why this content cannot be conceptual.  It violates his Generality Constraint.  The 
Generality Constraint says that for a content to be conceptual it must be 
repeatedly instantiable.  Since perceptual states are contentful states that do not 
require one to be able to articulate the content or instantiate the content on 
another occasion, then they are thereby nonconceptual content.
The upshot, at this point, of Evans’ account of the content of perceptual 
experience is that thought is grounded to a level of sensory information that is 
nonconceptual.  Experience itself provides the perceiver with a level of content 
that constrains conceptual thought.  Some parts of Evans’ account may sound 
odd.  His theory is rooted in information-processing theory.  His use of 
representation is vague but accepted in that field.  But I should note that it has a 
very different meaning from the conception of linguistic representation.  The point 
                                           
43 The distinction between personal and subpersonal goes like this: A subpersonal account 
describes cognitive activity at a level unavailable to the subject.  The personal level of description 
involves what is available to the subject in conscious experience.
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on Evans’ account is that the brain/mind in some way represents the information 
being provided by the senses and that this information then is used by our 
thought processes.  His nonconceptual content is largely if not completely 
subpersonal and in that sense fails to address what McDowell finds so 
compelling.  So far a theory of nonconceptual content cannot provide an account 
of content that would challenge McDowell’s argument that perceptual 
representational content is conceptual.
2.3.2. Peacocke on nonconceptual content 
Peacocke (1992) offers a very detailed defense of representative 
nonconceptual content.  His theory begins with the idea that “perceptual 
experiences represent the world as being a certain way.”44 Since something that 
represents must have a content, Peacocke moves to describe what this content 
might consist of and how it is individuated.  It should be noted that unlike Evans, 
Peacocke does take there to be conceptual content in experience. But, since the 
confrontation is with McDowell who is a full-blooded conceptualist, I will be 
primarily interested in describing and analyzing his notion of the nonconceptual 
content of perceptual experience.  Peacocke unpacks nonconceptual 
representative content in two ways, scenarios and protopropositions.  I will take 
each in turn.
The first type of content is a positioned scenario.  Peacocke takes 
scenario content to be the most basic kind of representational nonconceptual 
content.  It is a spatial type that is individuated by encompassing the correctness 
                                           
44 Peacocke (1992: 61).
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conditions for filling out (describing in analogue form maybe) the space around 
the perceiver.  The spatial type can be filled out in two moves:  First, one must fix 
an origin and axes.  Second, one must specify a way of filling out the space 
around the origin.  Specification would include identifying distance and direction 
from origin, surfaces, textures, hue, saturation, with degrees of solidity.45
The spatial type, or scenario content, is different from a concept in that 
Peacocke takes concepts to be individuated by possession conditions and 
criteria for cognitive significance.  Peacocke says this about scenarios, 
With this apparatus, we can then say what is required for the 
correctness of a representational content of the sort with which I am 
concerned.  Consider the volume of the real world around the 
perceiver at the time of the experience, with an origin and axes in 
the real world fixed in accordance with the labeling in the scenario.  
I call this a ‘scene.’  The content of the experience is correct if this 
scene falls under the way of locating surfaces and the rest that 
constitutes the scenario (Peacocke 1992: 64).
Scenario content then is necessary for establishing the most primitive concept by 
placing correctness conditions on the surrounding environment in view.  
The second nonconceptual content that Peacocke stipulates to provide 
grounding for the conceptual content of perceptual experience is 
protopropositional content.  Protopropositional content lies between positioned 
scenarios and conceptual content.  “Protopropositions contain objects, 
properties, and relations, rather than concepts thereof.”46 In this way this level of 
representational content can individuate conceptual content in a noncircular way.
                                           
45 Peacocke (1992: 62-3).
46 Peacocke (1992: 77).
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Peacocke uses an example of the difference between a square and a 
regular diamond in giving an account of the two concepts.  They are shaped just 
the same, but perceiving one is not like perceiving the other.  The concepts are 
individuated by the content provided by protopropositional content such as where 
certain symmetries lie and the bisecting of certain angles.
On another occasion, Peacocke (2001) refers to the way an object is 
perceived that individuates the concept used in demonstrative reference.  Since 
the way could be instantiated in any number of particular objects it is general, but 
at the same time nonconceptual.  In this sense there is a specific kind of 
nonconceptual content of experience that makes the judgment “That’s a square” 
different from the judgment “That’s a regular shaped diamond.”47  And it is this 
nonconceptual content that rationalizes the judgment because it has correctness 
conditions.  The correctness conditions are personally and subjectively available 
because the presence of certain objects, properties, or relations, given in certain 
ways, entitles the thinker to make a particular judgment.
The upshot of Peacocke’s argument is that he claims to have found 
noncircular concept-individuation by grounding concepts to a level of 
nonconceptual content.  We judge the way we do in demonstrative reference 
because of the way the world seems, individuated by his version of intentional 
content, at the time of perceiving.  Concept use is grounded in the accuracy of 
this nonconceptual content.  And critically, this is only possible if this content has 
correctness conditions.  As in McDowell’s view, it is the idea that experience has 
                                           
47 Peacocke (2001: 16).
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correctness conditions, defined by the representational content, that gives 
experience its justifying role.
This has been a hurried and choppy survey of some recent attempts to 
ground conceptual content to the world.  Both parties, conceptualist and 
nonconceptualist, are working within the broader framework of intentionalism.  
This is the theory that perception is a way of knowing, a fundamentally 
epistemological process and concept.  This is shown most clearly in the notion 
that perception has a content that represents the world in a certain way.   
Peacocke argues that such nonconceptual representational content provides 
good reasons for forming a belief about an object.  Below I will explore some of 
the commonalities and differences of Peacocke’s and McDowell’s views.  
Although they are divided over how to classify the informational content of 
perceptual experience, they are united in their commitment to experience being 
informationally contentful and having correctness conditions subjectively 
available to the agent perceiving. And again, this means that the concept of 
perceptual experience is limited to this representational content.  
The arguments for or against various forms of content are many and 
varied.  But, in the end both parties are searching for a way to articulate this 
central idea:  First, in order for perceptual experience to play a role in thought 
and action it must have correctness conditions.  Second, the correctness 
conditions of a particular perceptual experience are given by the content 
(intentional, representational) of that experience.  As was mentioned previously, 
both parties want to preserve the idea of the testimony of the senses.  But for this 
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metaphor to be translated into a literal theory of perceptual experience, one must 
be able to identify why it is the representational content that determines when 
one sees and not the other way around.
I take it intentionalism would fail if it were shown that nothing in experience 
could determine the accuracy of a representation of the way the world is.  
Another way of putting the same point would be that there is no identity between 
an experience and a single representational content.  This would show that 
perceptual experience cannot limit or articulate representational content.  I take it 
this would be a way of separating perceiving from representing and restoring a 
distinction between the two attitudes.  This of course would not mean that 
perceiving is not often a part of knowing or representing but only that it 
fundamentally is not a way of knowing.  It is fundamentally not a way of 
representing the world in any particular way.  This is another way of saying that 
our senses are silent and that perceptual experience should be separated from 
judgment.
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3. The Problem with Correctness Conditions and Perceptual Content
3.1. What should correctness conditions mean?
Above I offered some examples of the intentionalist theory of perceptual 
experience.  Typical of this view is the idea that perceptual experience has a 
unique representational content that determines the correctness conditions for 
the perceptual experience.  Often this is articulated by saying that perceptual 
experience represents the world to be a certain way.  It is then said that it is this 
represented way that is the identification of a perceptual experience.  The most 
important aspect of this content that represents the way the world appears to the 
perceiver is that it determines the correctness conditions for the perceptual 
experience.  It is the truth of the representation that determines the veridicality of 
the experience.
Peacocke argues for the importance of correctness conditions in 
establishing whether a representational content of experience holds as a rational 
reason for belief.  Peacocke says of the representational nonconceptual content 
of perceptual experience: “It is content which is evaluable as correct or as 
incorrect.”48  And again he says: 
The ways in which the properties of things are perceived […] 
contribute to the determination of which interval, which shape, 
which relation is perceived as instantiated.  Thereby, they 
contribute to the correctness conditions for the perceptual 
experience (Peacocke 2001: 4). 
                                           
48 Peacocke (2001: 2).
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And again, 
If the thinker’s perceptual systems are functioning properly, so that 
the nonconceptual representational content of his experience is 
correct, then when such experiences occur, the object thought 
about will really be square.  In this description of why the linkages 
are rational linkages, I make essential use of the fact that the 
nonconceptual content employed in the possession condition has a 
correctness condition that concerns the world (Peacocke 1992: 80).
It might be difficult to understand what this representational content is supposed 
to be.  Peacocke’s attempt to identify such content is elaborate, prompting such 
names as scenario content and protopropositional content.  Given its importance 
for grounding our conceptual beliefs and thoughts it will be helpful to elucidate 
some examples of just what this representational content is.  Dretske (1981) 
makes a distinction between analogue and digital informational content.  Digital 
content is equated with conceptual content and has paradigm examples like 
propositions.  Conceptual content is often thought of as digital, an exception 
being McDowell, because it represents its object in a less informationally rich 
sense.  Analogue content on the other hand is informational content whose 
paradigm instances are pictures or maps.  And we get a clearer meaning of what 
representational nonconceptual content is, as an example of analogue content, 
when Peacocke gives an example of the content that he is arguing for as not 
sensational (colored) but representational and nonconceptual none the less: 
When you look at the new Art Museum in Balbao, or see a new 
abstract sculpture, or the face of a person, you see each of these 
objects as having a quite specific shape and size.  Similarly, you 
see them as having quite specific shades of colors, surface textures 
and contours (Peacocke 2001: 2).  
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This is the fine grained, or we might say analogue, content of perceptual 
experience.  Notice, it is not the object, property, or relation that is given but the 
way each of them is given that matters.  We are talking about the specific way
each of these are given, because it is this specific way that is characteristic of 
this exact situation and that is the nonconceptual representational content of this 
perceptual experience.  But, if it is this rich analogue content of my perceptual 
experience that has correctness conditions, the next logical question that I want 
to ask is how to verify the correctness and who or what is doing the 
representing?  In other words, if conceptual content is dependent for its 
justificatory capacity on the correctness of this nonconceptual representational 
content, then how does one verify whether the condition of correctness is met? 
There are several different reasons one might give for taking the 
conditions for correctness to match the conditions in the world.  You might ask a 
bystander to verify whether they are receiving the same information about the 
world as you are.  If I want some verification that a certain perceptual content is 
correct I might ask my friend, “Do you see that so and so?”  It will provide me 
some consolation if my friend replies, “Yeah, I see that so and so.”  But all we 
have decided so far is that we each have similar enough perceptual judgments.  
But what has been assumed about this situation is that there is a question about 
the way the world is.  Aren’t there many occasions where seeing does not involve 
knowledge claims?  Should we assume that every case of seeing is a case of 
knowing something?  I think this is presumptuous.  Notice the difference between 
“I see the car” and “I see that the car is there.”  The first case is clearly not a case 
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of knowing anything.  A knowledge claim is not being made.  The second case 
involves a knowledge claim, but I think if we think clearly about the difference 
between the two, and the cases when either is appropriate, we will come to see 
that perceiving is not normally an epistemological concept.  It is clearly not a way 
of representing the world to be a certain way.49  I will discuss the times when it is 
used epistemologically below.
Another way to verify whether my perception is correct, on Peacocke’s 
account, is to verify whether my visual system is functioning normally.  The 
conclusion is commonsensically that since I am not normally given to illusions, if 
my system is functioning normally, under normal conditions, I am assured that 
the representational content is correct.  But if this is what Peacocke means by 
representational content I cannot think that he means representation as a 
cognitive science term and not as a knowledge term.  If we are to take it that 
judging that the world is a certain way is dependent, in cases of seeing, on the 
cognitive system functioning correctly, and that this is a significant form or 
representation, then I think we have been misled.  No one would deny that 
judging how things are in the world, in cases of seeing the world, would be 
dependent on the proper functioning of one’s perceptual system.  But this does 
not get us very far in understanding how perception has a content that represents 
the world as being a certain way, a way that is judgeable.  I think Peacocke 
waivers between an epistemological and a cognitively neutral conception of 
representation.
                                           
49 For a rich analysis of the epistemological uses of the concept of perception see Collins (1967).
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If the content is representational, then one would expect it to be something 
we could actually identify with some degree of accuracy on some perceptual 
occasions.  In other words, if the representational content just is whatever I think 
when I see that such and such is the case, then it is a trivial affair.  It is common 
sense to think about what we see and to take things to be the way we find them 
in the environment.  But if the representational content is supposed to determine 
what I see and define a perceptual experience then we must have some way of 
identifying it or we will be incapable of determining when a perceptual experience 
is correct or incorrect.  Peacocke has gone to elaborate lengths to describe some 
possible representational content.  But so far I cannot see how this is anything 
more than the correct functioning of a perceiver’s perceptual system.  And while 
psychologists may choose any version of representation for their own purposes 
this is certainly not a version of representation that intentionalism claims to be 
governing our perceptual experience.
3.2. An argument against correctness conditions
Intentionalism usually formulates its claim this way: “the phenomenal 
character of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the experience’s 
propositional content—that is, by what it represents.”50  McDowell will say it this 
way:
That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it 
can also be the content of a judgment.  It becomes the content of a 
judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value 
(McDowell 1996: 59).
                                           
50 Byrne (2001: 199).
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This is a strong claim.  Again, the claim is that there is a representational content 
that is a perceptual experience, the correctness of which determines whether the 
perceiving is veridical or not.  But so far I have seen no way of individuating this 
content except by accepting that taking the world to be such and such is a 
reliable guide to the representational content that determined the taking.
Travis (2004), following McDowell’s usage, has said that to think that 
perceptual experience has a determinate representational content is to see it as 
having a face value.  This face value is the representational content that may be 
either accepted or declined by the perceiver.  It is another way of saying that our 
senses testify, that experience offers us a determinate way the world is, and 
when experience is correct we have knowledge of the world.
My argument against the identification of perceptual experience with its 
representational content goes like this:
P1: Intentionalism depends on there being a unique 
representational content for a perceptual experience that 
determines the correctness conditions for the experience.
P2: There is no one way of representing an experience that 
would result in its being correct as opposed to incorrect.  An 
alternative way of formulating this is that there are many 
ways to represent a state of affairs in the world.
P3: It follows that if there are many ways of representing the way 
the world is when the world is involved in an experience of 
itself in a perceiver, then the determination of the 
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correctness conditions for the representation to match the 
world must come from some other source.  
C1: Following P1 and P2 intentionalism is false.  Experience of 
the world does not represent one way the world is.  
(P1) is a thesis about intentionalism.  It is uncontroversially a fact about that 
theory.  My argument depends on the strength of (P2).51
The way an experience represents the world to the perceiver is supposed 
to be found in the way the world seems or appears or looks to her.  Travis offers 
two points about this supposed representational content:  
First, we certainly do sometimes speak of things not being what 
they appear to be, or as, or what, they seem…where things may be 
or not as they appear, their appearing as they do is an utterly 
different and distinct phenomenon from anything being represented 
as so.  Second, though we are often enough confronted with 
appearances, that is not yet to say that the appearances, on a 
given occasion, add up to such a thing as ‘the way things appear to 
be’ (Travis 2004: 60).
What does the intentionalist want from this representational content?  I argued 
that their primary motivation was to dispel the conclusion from the argument from 
illusion.  That conclusion said that what is primary in perception is that things 
seem a certain way to the perceiver.  The sense-datist argued that this meant 
that there were intermediaries in perceptual experience, that perception was 
indirect at best.  The intentionalist wants to preserve some version of direct 
perception and so changes the conception of perceptual experience to a 
representational content.  This content is not an intermediary object between the 
                                           
51 My argument is taken loosely from Travis (2004).  While I cannot be sure that I follow 
everything in Travis’ thesis and do not want to attribute to him views that are not his own, his 
articulation of the central problem of intentionalism is central to my understanding.  
48
perceiver and the perceived world but a propositional content that represents the 
state of affairs that the experience is about.  This is then what determines the 
correctness of the experience, namely whether the experience represents the 
way the world is correctly.  
This is clearly seen by how intentionalists take seemings to work.  The 
way things seem, how the world is represented, may or may not be the way the 
world actually is, but does determine the conditions whereby the experience may 
be correct if the state of affairs in the world is the way the experience represents 
them to be.  I have belabored this point in an attempt to make clear the role that 
this content is meant to play.  The question then becomes whether there is just 
one way for an experience of the world to represent the world to the perceiver?  If 
there is not, if intentional content of some kind cannot fix uniquely the way the 
world is in some one perceptual experience then it is impossible for intentional 
content to play the role it does.  Even if perceptual experience involves some 
level of representation, maybe better construed as indexing or recognitional, it 
will be better construed as relying on the phenomenological content and not 
determining it.  It is also questionable whether it will be proper to talk about 
experience representing things in any way.  We thus may see ourselves to being 
able to understand seemings as taking or perceptually judging the world to be a 
certain way without the need to postulate full-blown representation, something I 
believe experience proper is ill equipped to do.  
Let us then take an example.  I will choose simple examples in order to 
articulate the difference between representing and taking.  I take taking to be 
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indexing or noting the way things are.  Let’s say I am looking at two friends 
interacting.  I see that Joe has given something to Bill.  The purported 
representational content of my experience, the way the world seems, is that Joe 
has given something to Bill.  What, of what I saw, would determine whether this 
were true or not?  There is nothing in the way the world appears that will assure 
me of whether Joe gave a gift, or whether Bill forced Joe to give, or whether Joe 
owed Bill the item.  The determination of the correct representation depends not 
on me, or on the way the world appears but on some third item, namely some 
unifying situation that makes one out of many ways of representing that situation 
true.  It is unclear how perceiving this scene could determine just one way of 
representing the scene.  It is also unclear how my taking things to be the way I 
took them can be counted as a way of representing. That is not to say that I do 
not take things to be a certain way, but that the taking is not a full representing.  
Nothing like this happens in perceptual experience.
Let us try another example.  “I see a green book.”  Have I represented 
anything to be a certain way?  I have certainly associated a certain color with a 
certain object.  But it does not follow that there is any one way things must be in 
the world for my taking the book to be green to be true or false.  When I see that 
the book is green, I merely note it.  Let me represent the seeing to someone else.  
I hold the book up to a friend and say, “Do you see that this book is green?”  And 
he says, “No, that book is olive.”  Or, “No, that book is lime” or whatever other 
color one might represent to be green.  On a certain shared understanding, or 
way of representing things, my representation might be true or false.  But it does 
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not follow that my perceptual experience represents the way things should be in 
order for them to be that way.  That is simply not the role that experience plays.
Two conclusions are important for this argument.  I will state them 
negatively here and leave them to be stated positively in the theory I articulate 
from Peirce later.  First, I have seen no way of understanding how experience 
can be a source of representing how things should be represented. While 
perception certainly involves being aware of the perceived object it does not 
follow that this awareness is a mode of representation. Representation always 
involves an object, a sign or some mode of representing, and an interpretation, or 
some might call it an understanding.52  If experience did represent the world 
correctly or incorrectly, that would mean that there was one right way of 
representing the world for each state of affairs which would eliminate what Peirce 
called the interpretant or interpretation.  But the most common forms of 
perception involve no amount of interpretation.  There is nothing that needs 
interpreting unless something is unclear or ambiguous.  And if this were the case 
it would not follow that the experience would contain a content that could 
determine the interpretation.  Second, as far as I can see, all attempts by 
intentionalists to formulate any representational content that might determine the 
way the experience represents the world are always abstracted from what I have 
called knowledge claims involving perception, or judgments which are still 
                                           
52 This is almost exactly the way Charles Peirce articulates full representation in his writings.  
Peirce, by my lights, investigates the relationship between these three components of 
representation in far greater detail than any philosopher to date.  And, while this thesis is not an 
investigation of semiotic theory I do owe this triadic theory of representation to Peirce at every 
turn.  See “On a New List of Categories” for an early version of Peirce’s view as well as “Sundry 
Logical Conceptions” and “New Elements” for a more fully developed theory of the nature and 
logic of representation.
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different from what Peirce called perceptual judgments.  Intentionalism only 
works if one assumes at the front end that perception automatically is a mode of 
representing the world to be a certain way.  But if we inquire whether perception 
is always a mode of representing or whether a perceptual experience can ever 
be identified with just one way of representing the world we are at a loss on how 
to develop this.  Intentionalism cannot meet these challenges.  It takes 
knowledge claims, representings, as paradigms for perceptions.  But it just isn’t 
the case that perceptions are paradigmatic epistemological events.  
By saying that perception is not primarily a mode of knowing I am saying 
that it lacks representational correctness conditions.  This of course does not 
mean that illusions are not possible but only that it is not the representational 
content of experience that either determines the correctness of a perception or 
determines the role perception plays in connecting thought to the world.  
McDowell and Peacocke both want to enlist perception as a crucial link between 
thought and the world.  On their construal perception has a representational 
content that, when correct, can also be the content of a belief or reason.  For 
both this is a way of defending the correspondence theory that our experience 
plays not only a causal role but also and critically a justificatory role in 
experience.  But I think this epistemological worry has caused these philosophers 
to misconstrue how to understand the concept of perception.  Perception is not 
primarily a way of knowing, or a way of representing the world.  When I perceive I 
am presented with a way things are, but this way is not representational.  When 
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perception is a way of knowing there is an extra epistemological element 
involved.  But this is separate from perception.  
3.3. The alternative causal account
I think that the causal understanding is both intuitive and correct.  So, my 
attempt will be to show that some general form of the causal account is 
necessary but not sufficient to generate a theory of perception.  Unfortunately 
intentionalism cannot accommodate this causal account.  Valberg (1992) calls 
the causal story “the problematic reasoning”.  In its most general form the 
reasoning takes the form of a causal chain of events that lead from the contact of 
light on the retina, which excites optical nerves, and eventually dead ends in the 
brain.  But this is not the causal account we are interested in.  The causal 
account that matters here says that for a subject S to have an experience X it 
must have been caused by an object O.  Negatively stated it means that S’s 
experience X is not possible without being caused by O.  I don’t take this causal 
story to be problematic on its own. But, when matched with the traditional 
problem of illusion and/or hallucination (which we will discuss in more detail 
below) it generates a particular theory about how perception of the world is 
possible.
The theory is generated this way: First, the causal account is accepted.  
For S to have experience X, then O must have caused X.  This is a condition for 
the possibility of perceptual experience.  Second, one recognizes the reality of 
hallucination.  Illusion will be discussed below, but the most difficult problem is 
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generated by hallucinations;53 those logical philosophical possibilities 
philosophers think up to test their theories.  If these are experiences of some 
kind, of S, and we may call them hallucinatory experiences, call them Y 
experiences, then they must have been caused.  They also, as Y experiences of 
S, seem to meet the causal condition because they are indistinguishable from X.  
It follows that for S to experience Y, Y must have been caused by something.  
Third, add the indistinguishability criteria.  The indistinguishability criteria says 
that whatever is seen in either veridical experiences X or hallucinatory 
experiences Y are indistinguishable from each other both in their phenomenal 
and informational content.  An example from Shakespeare commonly makes the 
point.  Whether Hamlet is viewing a real dagger or a hallucination of a real 
dagger is impossible for Hamlet to tell outside of reaching out and grasping for it, 
assuming his sense of touch is not delusive either.  Fourth, this example 
generates the common cause thesis.54  The common cause thesis says that 
since indistinguishable experiences X and Y of S are caused, it must be the 
same O that causes X and Y when those experiences are had.  
This is a way of formulating the sense-data conclusion.  Intentionalism 
rightly found problems with these supposed mental objects that exist whenever a 
phenomenal presence exists.  But intentionalists did not reject the common 
cause thesis.  They moved the common cause from an object content to a 
                                           
53 There is controversy amongst philosophers about whether there are indistinguishable veridical 
and hallucinatory experiences.  Some philosophers prefer to test their theory of perception 
against this logical possibility, namely that two experience might be indistinguishable and yet one 
be veridical while the other is hallucinatory.
54 See Martin (2004) for further explanation of what he calls the common kind assumption.
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representational content.  This is why intentionalism about perceptual experience 
cannot be formulated as a relational view about experience.  
A relational view understands experience as a two-place relation between 
a subject and an object.  But if experience is equated with representational 
content, then it cannot be intrinsically a relation to objects but only to its 
intentional objects.  In this sense the intentional theory fails as the sense-data 
theory did.  By supporting the common cause thesis, it misses the essential point 
about experience that it is an interaction with the world, a double-sided 
consciousness as Peirce described it.  
The point that matters is that the question of how experience of the world 
can play an explanatory role in knowledge about the world is answered by 
referring to a representation and not by the object that the representation 
represents.  Even if the perceptual experience is intentional and therefore linked 
to an intentional object we lose some of the explanatory value of experience by 
losing the idea that experience is relational, not representational.  If perceptual 
experience is representational, then the closest contact we have with the world is 
with intentional objects.  But this does not give us the contact we know we have.  
When I see an object I take it that the object plays a crucial role in causing my 
experience of the object.
The problem is that on either the sense-data or intentionalist formulation 
perceptual experience is conceived of as less than interaction with the world.  By 
appealing to mental objects or representational content even in “veridical 
perception” the objects are not primarily a part of the concept of perceptual 
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experience.  The alternative formulation, and the only other one on offer, is 
disjunctivism.55
Disjunctivism states that perceptual experiences are intrinsically different 
from hallucinations.  The basic idea is to reject the common cause thesis.  By 
doing this, the disjunctivist conceives of perceptual experience as a relation 
between a perceiver and an object that results in a perceptual experience.  The 
disjunctivist will admit that hallucinatory experiences are potentially subjectively 
indistinguishable from perceptual experiences.  What they deny is that this 
should be a reason to identify the two experiences as experiences of the same 
kind.  Disjunctivism has this advantage over intentionalism and sense-data 
theories: Perceptual experience is a relation between a perceiver and the object 
perceived.  It postulates no mental objects or representational content that an 
experience of the world in some way supervenes upon.  Because I think the 
causal story is important I think it a good reason for perception to be viewed as a 
relation and not some sort of mental or intentional state common to both 
hallucination and perception.  When I use “see” to describe an experience it is a 
success.  When I hallucinate it is a failure to “see.”  The two states have no 
content in common.  Neither do they share a representational content.
Also, the causal story and the resulting disjunctivism should not be 
confused with the causal theory of perception articulated by Grice (1989).  Or at 
                                           
55 Disjunctivism about perceptual experience (hereafter “disjunctivism”) has its roots in Hinton 
(1973).  Snowdon (1979, 1990) defends a disjunctive theory of perception also.  McDowell 
defends disjunctivism but within an intentionalist framework.  This distinguishes a difference 
between disjunctivism about experience with object contents from McDowell’s disjunctivism about 
representational contents.  The only type of disjunctivism that I think is a reasonable alternative to 
intentionalism and sense-data theories adherence to the common cause thesis is of a Hinton or 
Snowdon type.
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least it should be noted that Grice’s account is not sufficient to generate a 
complete theory of perception.  The causal account is necessary but not 
sufficient for perception. Campbell has articulated a hypothesis of just how 
perceptual experience involves a causal account without succumbing to some 
version of the causal theory.56  His main ambition is to preserve the explanatory 
role of experience which he argues cannot be done on any representationalist 
model, while incorporating the valuable work done in the descriptive sciences 
that show how important activity within the body (eyes, brain, nerves) is to 
perception.  He says:
One analogy is that the Relational View thinks of perception as like 
viewing the world through a pane of glass.  It would plainly be a 
mistake to hold a Representationalist View of panes of glass: to 
hold that the only way in which it can happen that you see a dagger 
through a pane of glass is by having a representation of a dagger 
appear on the glass itself (Campbell 2002: 118).
And further,
It is not that the brain is constructing a conscious inner 
representation whose intrinsic character is independent of the 
environment.  It is, rather, that there is a kind of complex 
adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in order 
that you can be visually related to the things around you;  
(Campbell 2002: 119).
Why this diversion into a justification of a causal story along natural realist 
and disjunctivist lines?  The traditional sense-data theory, including generally the 
views of Descartes, Locke and Hume, was the antithesis of this theory of 
perception.  Problems with sense-data theories have led to, to some extent, the 
formulation of intentionalism, that the content of perceptual experience is 
                                           
56 Campbell (2002: chapters 6 and 7).
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intentional and representational.  My point has been to show that a theory of 
perception, one with a worldly-object content, need not involve either mental 
objects or representational content in order to provide for at least the presence of 
the world before the perceiver.  I will argue through Peirce below that there often 
is a mental component to perception, but this does not involve a mental object or 
full-blown representational content.  It is best construed as an indexing of the 
world closer to recognition or noting generated causally by attention to objects in 
the world.  This is the opposite of the other theories that argue that something 
significantly mental produces a seeing.    
Before analyzing the primary motivation for intentionalism, which I have 
taken to be the argument from illusion, I want to discuss McDowell’s 
disjunctivism, which occupies a unique position between the common cause 
intentionalist and sense-datist and the relational view articulated on behalf of the 
natural realist.
3.4 Why disjunctivism cannot save intentionalism
How does McDowell fair, given his allegiance to intentionalism about 
perceptual experience minus the allegiance to the common cause thesis.  On his 
version, one must appeal to the way a mature adult, well integrated into cultural 
and linguistic practices I suppose, views reasons in the world with their 
distinctively human sense.57  McDowell states it this way:
The feature of language that really matters is rather this: that a 
natural language, the sort of language into which human beings are 
first initiated, serves as a repository of tradition, a store of 
                                           
57 This distinctively human sense is conceived, by McDowell, as a “second nature” in McDowell 
(1996).  See also McDowell (2000).
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historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what 
(McDowell 1996: 126).
Does McDowell’s position, locating representational content at the level of 
concepts and embracing disjunctive mental states, produce a more satisfactory 
concept of perceptual experience?
In McDowell’s framework, conceptual capacities are drawn on passively in 
experience so that the world is experienced conceptually, period.  But I have 
argued that seeing is not a mode of seeing that p or seeing that such and such is 
so, which is a way of representing things to be so, as McDowell needs in order 
for experience to play the role in stipulating how the world should be represented 
for experience to be veridical.  McDowell is not arguing that we take the world to 
be such and so but that it is presented for taking that way.  I do not see how 
disjunctivism about this intentional content can help overcome this criticism, but 
here is how McDowell articulates it:
But suppose we saynot at all unnaturally–that an appearance that 
suchandsuch is the case can be either a mere appearance or the 
fact that suchandsuch is the case making itself perceptually 
manifest to someone.  As before, the object of experience in the 
deceptive cases is a mere appearance.  But we are not to accept 
that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a 
mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact 
itself (McDowell 1998a: 386-387).
It must be remembered that for McDowell talk of objects is talk of Fregean 
senses.58  But one might ask what has been gained by shifting the burden of 
proof onto the grasping of disjunctively structured conceptual perceptual 
experiences?59  I would say not much.  In fact something has been lost.  While 
                                           
58 See McDowell (1998). 
59 Campbell (2002) and Brewer (2006) have raised this criticism against McDowell.
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disjunctivism about Fregean senses would be a better view than the common 
factor view if perceptual experience worked that way, perceptual experience
doesn’t.  Pace McDowell, the senses are silent.  And any content, even indexical, 
is a form of taking on the other side of sensing and does not govern sensing the 
way McDowell intends conceptual content to do.  
Perhaps the greatest challenge to McDowell’s view comes from the lack of 
continuity between experience of young children and animals, notably 
preconceptual and prelinguistic, and the perceptual experience of humans 
ushered into a linguistic community.  The consequence of identifying experience 
with conceptual capacities is that the former group lacks experience.  However 
we come to understand perceptual experience, it would seem a detriment and 
not a plus if one’s theory prevented an understanding of experience that could be 
shared with pre-linguistic humans or other species. 
The upshot of this discussion is not good for any version of 
representationalism about perceptual experience.  In the intentionalist case the 
supposed representational content of perceptual experience is received on a 
common factor view.  The common factor view stops short of making experience 
of the world objective, because experience, even when veridical, is 
representational and not relational.  McDowell attempts to make perceptual 
experience objective by conceiving seeing that p disjunctively and not on a 
common factor view.  But McDowell, although moving in the right direction 
toward disjunctivism, still leaves experience as representational and not 
relational.  As I have argued, it is hard to see how experience might represent the 
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world so that some representation of it, and not a host of others, is the right way, 
and would lead to seeing.
While we are heading toward a new conception of perceptual experience, 
I think that the other intuition that has driven the representationalist model needs 
to be dealt with.  This is the problem of motivating intentionalism by cases from 
illusion in perceptual experience.  
3.5. Rooting out the illusion motivation for correctness conditions
I stated above that I thought there were two reasons philosophers had 
moved from discussion of perceptual experience as of objects to perceptual 
experience as a representational content.  I have argued that one of these 
factors, the causal story, can only be preserved if perceptual experience is 
viewed disjunctively.  There will be more on a positive theory about this below.  
The second factor was the problem of illusion.  Let me give several examples of 
how the intentionalists intend their account of perceptual experience to deal with 
the traditional problem of illusion and how they characterize illusory perceptual 
states.
Armstrong (1968) says, “…an account of perception can be given in terms 
of acquiring of beliefs about the physical world.  Many of the traditional problems 
of the philosophy of perception can be solved at this stage.”60  For Armstrong 
these beliefs are acquired by means of the senses.  It follows that the acquiring 
of true beliefs about the environment is veridical perception and the acquiring of 
false beliefs through the senses is a case of perceptual illusion.  “Perceptual 
                                           
60 Armstrong (1968: 208).
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experience, as opposed to mere perception, is simply this flow [of information] in 
so far as we are conscious of it….  The content of our perceptions, which so 
many philosophers want to turn into a non-physical object, is simply the content 
of the beliefs involved.”61  
Part 12 of Armstrong’s chapter on perception is crucial to his argument 
that his Belief Theory (a strong version of the intentionalist program) can fulfill the 
promissory note I originally quoted about solving the traditional problem of 
perception.  He gives several examples of perceptual illusion including the stick 
in water looking bent, the visual size of the sun compared to its true size, and the 
dot on the horizon that someone might claim is their house seen from afar.  He 
criticizes the traditional representative and phenomenalist theory focus on the 
objects of perception, and then he offers his own alternative to solve this problem 
of illusion.  
But if we conceive of perception as nothing but the acquiring of true 
and false beliefs about the current state of the perceiver’s body and 
environment, or of mental events that resemble acquiring of such 
beliefs, an extraordinarily simple and natural dissolution of the 
problem is possible (Armstrong 1968: 242).
I will highlight his resolution to the stick partially submerged in water in order to 
later juxtapose my own alternative.  Armstrong says “it is a fact of nature that the 
observer acquires a false belief that the stick is bent….”62  Armstrong takes it that 
he has brought satisfactory resolution by moving the content of perceptual 
experience from an object to beliefs, or some comparable mental state, acquired 
through the senses.  
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Anscombe (1981) makes a similar move in her important paper on the 
intentionality of sensation.  She takes it that both naïve realists and sense-datists 
have missed the crucial point that perceptual experience is “marked by 
intentionality”.  She offers a list of ten examples of common illusory experiences 
that are supposed to show the intentionality of perception including blurry vision, 
mirages, and ringing in the ears.  But, later she offers a truer version of illusion in 
the sense that the object is actually there (in whatever sense an intentionalist 
means this):
I once opened my eyes and saw the black striking surface of a 
matchbox which was standing on one end; the other sides of the 
box were not visible.  This was a few inches from my eye and I 
gazed at it in astonishment wondering what it could be.  Asked to 
describe the impression as I remember it, I say: ‘Something black 
and rectangular, on end, some feet away, and some feet high.’  I 
took it for three or four feet distant, and it looked if anything, like a 
thick post, but I knew there could be no such thing in my bedroom 
(Anscombe 1981: 16).
She offers this resolution: “These were not judgments of distance based on 
identifications of things the supposition of what thing it might be was based on 
an impression of size which went with a false impression of distance.”63  Crucial 
to her account of perceptual experience and its intentionality is that the content 
that is true or false is not that of a judgment but an impression, specifically an 
impression of information about the environment.  
Lastly, indulge me to review Searle’s (1995) account of the intentionality of 
perception and the impact on the issue of cases of perceptual illusion.  Searle 
says, 
                                           
63 Anscombe (1981: 16).
63
The argument that visual experiences are intrinsically intentional, in 
sum, is that they have conditions of satisfaction which are 
determined by the content of the experience in exactly the same 
sense that other Intentional states have conditions of satisfaction 
which are determined by the content of the states (Searle 1995: 
42).
Searle then goes on to enlist the help of illusions in understanding ways that the 
conditions for satisfaction are not fulfilled.  He says, in these cases, “it is the 
visual experience and not the world which is at fault.”64  In Searle’s sense our 
senses deceive us.  He invokes several examples like the common Muller-Lyer 
illusion as well as one similar to Armstrong’s dot/house example where the moon 
is seen to be two different sizes from different places as it rises.  In the moon 
case, the intentional contents are in conflict with our belief that the moon stays 
the same size, and yet the intentional contents are there none-the-less.
I think the survey of the above intentionalists’ theory of perception shows 
how the intentionalist invokes various cases of illusion to argue that perceptual 
experience has intentional content.  But I want to show that this is not the only 
way of dealing with cases of illusion and in fact raises problems rather than 
resolve the issue satisfactorily.  The problem with the intentionalist view is that it 
deals with illusion by making the most fundamental aspect of perceptual 
experience to be constituted representationally, whether conceptually or 
nonconceptually.  The cases of illusion show in vivid form how the intentionalist 
robs experience of its fundamental power by assimilating representational 
thought and visual seeing.  I think this is stimulated by the fundamental empiricist
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claim that something like Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance grounds 
inferential knowledge.
Here is how I summarize the views of the above intentionalist.  First, it is 
asserted that illusion poses problems for natural realists65 and sense-datists 
alike.  The reason is that both of these views are object-content views and cases 
of illusion show that it cannot be ordinary objects that are the content of visual 
experience.  Second, the fundamental error, according to the intentionalist, is in 
not appreciating the basic fact that visual experience is fundamentally 
characterized by its intentional content usually construed as the way the world 
seems to the perceiver or the representing the world to be a certain way.  Third, 
by acknowledging that visual experience is characterized by its intentional 
content we are supposed to understand how visual experiences can result in 
cases of illusion.  When experience represents the world the wrong way an 
illusion results.  When experience represents the world correctly the object is 
seen and the seeing is veridical.  
This characterization is realized by the fundamental supposition that our 
senses communicate information or represent the world in a certain way, 
veridical when true, illusory when false.  These are other ways of saying that 
perceptual experiences have a face value.  In spite of the supposed gain in 
explaining cases of illusion what has the intentionalist theory lost, if anything?  I 
think that the intentionalist theory has lost a crucially important distinction 
between experience, as a presentation of the phenomenal world, and thought, 
                                           
65 The term commonly used by Anscombe, Armstrong, and Searle for natural realist is naïve 
realist.
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which is about what is presented and has correctness conditions.  Another way 
of describing what has been lost is a distinction between the interactive double-
consciousness of experience, and the indexing that takes place characteristically 
toward judging or characterizing the objects in view.  Experience is characterized 
primarily in this distinction as undergoing or being imposed upon, whereas 
representation is something that a subject does in response to experience on the 
right occasion for it.  In other words, it is precisely the supposition of experience 
as informationally rich that has robbed experience of its fundamental 
significance.  
The intentionalist says that experience has correctness conditions that it 
“speaks” or “communicates” to the subject.  Anscombe spoke this way when she
described being impressed with false information about size and distance.  
Searle, too, describes the illusory experience as, in a sense, saying how the 
experience is the way that it is.  We can see this same way of speaking about 
experience in McDowell and Peacocke’s more contemporary debate over the 
kind of representative content that perceptual experience is.  McDowell says, “In 
the Muller-Lyer illusion, one’s experience represents the two lines as being 
unequally long, but someone in the know will refrain from judging that that is how 
things are.”66  And we have already discussed at length the way that Peacocke 
uses “correctness conditions” to describe how perceptual experience represents 
the world in a certain way.
                                           
66 McDowell (1996: 11).
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While the case of illusion does pose a challenge to any theory of 
perception, I think it can be dealt with without imposing correctness conditions on 
perceptual experience viewed as representational content.  I have argued that 
there is no way of understanding perceptual experience to be representational 
content, namely because the ways the world can be represented cannot be 
determined by looking alone.  Another reason for finding the intentionalist 
motivation hopeless will be argued below.
3.6. An alternative account of illusion
Brewer (forthcoming)67 has described how it is possible to understand the 
Muller-Lyer illusion without appealing to the representational content of 
experience.  He proposes an object view holding that perceptual experience 
“involves a subjective experiential presentation of its object in a way in which 
thought does not.”  Under this view the Muller-Lyer illusion is handled this way.  
The actual presentation of the lines is of two lines that are the same size.  The 
context in which the lines are seen, contained by hash marks, causes the subject 
to take or judge the experience to be characteristic of an experience of lines of 
different length.68  In this explanation of the illusion there are two factors:  First 
there is the experience of two lines of equal length with two hash marks on the 
sides.  Second, there is the classifying or judging by the subject of how things are 
                                           
67 “How to Account for Illusion” and “Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience” 
forthcoming.  Both can be found at this web address as of 08/06:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/staff/brewer/.
68 For the full treatment of the argument about the Muller-Lyer illusion see Brewer “How to 
Account for Illusion”.  It should be noted that I am indebted to Brewer’s development of the Object 
View for my later treatment of other illusory cases.  For other treatment of the Object View see 
Brewer “Perception and Content”, Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience” as well as 
Brewer’s forthcoming book length treatment of the Object View in the tentatively titled Perception 
and Its Objects.
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in the experience.  What has been separated is what was conflated in the 
intentionalist account, namely being confronted with worldly objects such as lines 
on a paper, and the judging of those lines to be a certain way.
The advantage of such a view is that it preserves a characteristic of 
perceptual experience not preserved in the intentionalist explanation.  On this 
view, as Travis (2004) says, taking his cue from Austin (1962), the senses are 
dumb.  They merely provide a view to the perceiver who then takes it in.  On this 
view there is no representational content determining, on the front end, how the 
world is.  This determination is made by the perceiver; it is a case of taking, not 
of full-blooded representing.  I want to apply this explanation to one other 
example of illusion championed by Anscombe, Armstrong and Searle.  
This is the example of seeing an object from different perspectives, 
usually characterized by difference in position or distance.  Armstrong speaks of 
seeing a house from a distance and acquiring the false belief that one is seeing a 
white dot.   But, he reasons, if one is familiar with the deception (emphasis mine) 
and really knows that it is the house one is seeing, then one is able to 
understand the intentional content of seeing “that white dot” as speaking 
loosely.69  In the same way, Searle discusses seeing the moon on the horizon 
and directly overhead and highlights that the intentional content of either 
perceptual experience is that the moon changes sizes.  Here is how he describes 
it:
The visual experiences do indeed have as part of their respective 
Intentional contents that the moon is smaller overhead that it is on 
the horizon, and the argument for this is that if we imagine that the 
                                           
69 Armstrong (1968: 242-43).
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visual experiences remained as they are now, but that the beliefs 
were absent, that we simply had no relevant beliefs, then we really 
would be inclined to believe that the moon had changed in size 
(Searle 1983: 56).
These cases may be representative of any case where the senses 
function normally under normal conditions and yet the intentionalist reasons that 
we receive misleading information from our senses, namely incorrect 
representational content, and that this is the explanation of why either of two 
things happen:  Either we are misled by our senses or the illusion persists in 
spite of our beliefs differing from this supposed representational content.  
Besides the fact that this view robs experience of its characteristic subjective 
presentative character, another problem arises.
The problem is that this type of view takes error to be located at the 
sensory level.  In other words, the locus of mistake is proposed to be at a level of 
activity in the human animal beyond self-control.  It implies that somehow the 
senses have presented the world potentially less than accurate.  In fact, the view 
seems to suggest that, even before judgment or thought, error is infused at the 
experiential level.  Peacocke and McDowell need perceptual experience to have 
correctness conditions for it to play a role in justifying beliefs about the world.  
But given that under such normal conditions and normal sensory functioning the 
human animal is potentially sensorily deceived, it seems hard to see how 
judgment could ever get a foothold.  And, when pressed to give an example of 
when a perceptual experience would actually be accurate in any of these cases, 
the intentionalist is hard pressed to come up with an answer.  At what point does 
one perceive a house or the moon or any other object veridically?
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I want to linger on this point for a moment.  Take Searle’s example.  Just 
because our senses provide us with phenomenally changing, perspective-
sensitive views of the world, does this mean there is a correct and incorrect way 
to see the moon?  From what perspective would a perception be correct?  Do we 
need to specify differing representational contents to account for the difference 
between viewing a house from up close and from far away or to explain viewing 
the moon horizontally and then vertically?  I think not.  As I have argued 
previously, when our senses are working normally under normal conditions they 
provide the perceiver with an unmediated view of the world.  No representational 
content need be employed in order to explain how the sensory system places the 
world in view.
On the other hand, if the senses are fundamentally dumb, and by that I 
mean silent as opposed to stupid, and all intentional content is primarily a 
function of taking or judging the world to be such and such, then error is put back 
in its proper place.  Under normal conditions for viewing the world such as those 
mentioned in the above examples we are not at risk for confusing errors of taking 
the world to be a certain way with sensory experience.  Sensory experience is 
fundamentally dumb or silent.  It does not inform representationally but presents 
the world to the viewer.  As Peirce describes the situation with a touch of 
metaphor:
The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind, 
essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand for 
anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for 
anything else, not "as" anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my 
soul and stands there in the doorway.  It is very insistent, for all its 
silence (CP 7.619-620).
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3.7. Summary: Why we don’t need representational intentionalism to 
perceive
I have argued that intentionalism about the content of perceptual 
experience is found wanting on two accounts.  Intentionalism was motivated by 
the failure of sense-data theories about mental object-contents.  The response 
involved shifting the content of perceptual experience to representational content 
of a conceptual or nonconceptual sort.  This was thought to be a better account 
because it seemed more congenial to limit our perceptual experience, as it 
relates to knowledge about the world, to its informational content.  Implicit in this 
formulation though is the idea that experience represents the world to be a 
certain way.  Despite the different theories offered for the status of intentional 
content in perceptual experience, I argued that intentionalism falls short in two 
critical areas.
The first argument showed that intentionalism cannot accommodate the 
explanatory role that perceptual experience is commonly taken to play, namely 
that of being experience with the world.  By failing to find a satisfactory 
articulation for the representational content of experience I opted for scrapping 
the idea that experience represents the world in a way that determines the 
correctness of that experience.  This was not meant to eliminate such mental 
events as taking the world to be a certain way, as when I see that such and such 
is the case, but merely to understand this taking to be dependent on more than 
the world for correctness.  Experience presents the perceiver with an opportunity 
for taking, but does not represent the world to be a certain way.  Positively 
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stated, as far as representational content is concerned, the senses are silent.  I 
then argued, second, that one of the major contributing motivations for 
intentionalism, namely the argument from illusion, can be dealt with in a 
satisfactory way, without theorizing about the intentionality of perceptual 
experience.  I argued that cases of illusion can be accounted for by how we 
judge the world to be, which shifts the locus of error on to perceptual judgment 
and not experience proper.  
I argued that another account of perceptual experience is needed by 
removing the motivation for representation in perceptual experience and showing 
how intentionalism failed to meet the desired explanatory role commonly thought 
to accompany experience.  The account I now offer hopefully will meet these two 
challenges in a sufficiently satisfactory way.  The main error, then, of 
intentionalism is in positing intentional content at the level of experience.  I hope 
to show that Peirce’s twolevel account of perception will put the roles of 
experience and correctness conditions into their proper place again.
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4. Resolving a Difficulty in Charles Peirce’s Theory of Perception
4.1. A short introduction to Peirce’s theory of perception
I want now to turn to the theory of perception espoused by Charles Peirce.  
I will call Peirce’s theory a “TwoLevel View”.  I think that only on such a view 
can the necessary distinctions be maintained between experiencing and having 
correctness conditions or intentionality. At the end I will suggest a way for dealing 
with the justificatory issue that is so compellingly raised by McDowell’s account of 
conceptualism about perceptual experience.  But this will have to remain a 
suggestion, because before that suggestion can be made, in spite of McDowell’s 
arguing for the position from a transcendental ameliorative perspective, I must 
account for these other characteristics of perceptual experience that McDowell’s 
account leaves out.  It is this aspect that Peirce’s theory so well brings in to view.  
The following will develop first by exploring Peirce’s own theory and making clear 
his distinctions.  Then I will apply these distinctions to the contemporary 
Intentionalist position, showing the contrast and also how Peirce’s theory deals 
more satisfactorily with the issues intentionalism seeks to resolve, namely 
representational content and illusion. 
Peirce, as early as 1864, wrote about one of the central issues in the 
philosophy of perception.  The issue is whether perception is immediate or 
inferential.70   Shortly thereafter Peirce delivered his “On a New List of 
Categories” where he took for granted the Kantian theory of conceptions playing 
                                           
70 W1 (1982: 152).  This essay is known as “On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception”. 
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the role of “reducing the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity”.71  I have 
noted these instances in order to show that perception and experience were 
issues central to Peirce from the earliest years of his philosophical writing.  But 
there is reason to leave these early writings and focus on Peirce’s Arisbe 
Period.72 I focus on this period because it is during this time that Peirce’s 
philosophy took on its mature form. His development of Critical Common-
sensism is crucial for his mature theory of perception.73 In 1903 Peirce gave his 
Harvard Lectures where perception featured largely in his proof of pragmatism.74  
Peirce also wrote “Telepathy” which involved his most sustained and original 
analysis of perception.75 For this reason my analysis will be centered on the year 
1903 and these two important texts.76
Peirce’s theory of perception is both original, straightforward, and 
resembles theories put forward by contemporary philosophers dissatisfied with 
the contemporary intentional account of perceptual experience.  It has generated 
a handful of articles among Peirceans and has been represented prominently in 
                                           
71 W2 (1984: 49).
72 Fisch (1986).  This period encompasses the years after Peirce moved to Arisbe, 1887-1914.  
Fisch notes that this period is both the longest and most productive of Peirce’s life.
73  I take my cue here from Haack (1994: 10).  She makes the conjecture that Kant's influence 
was lessened by the increased influence of Thomas Reid in Peirce’s later years.  She also shows 
how Peirce synthesized the elements of Kantian critical philosophy and Reid’s common-sensism 
in the immediate (percept) and interpretive (perceptual judgment) elements of his philosophy of 
perception.   
74 I was directed to this proof largely through the excellent “Introduction” from The Essential 
Peirce: Selected Writings, Volume 2 written by Houser (1998: xxxiv-xxxv).
75 CP (7.597-688).
76 I have selected other texts from 1901, 1902, 1903, and 1906.
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several chapters of book length analyses of Peirce’s philosophy.77  But it has 
gone largely unnoticed by the broader philosophical community concerned with 
these issues, in spite of its close affinity with some contemporary views. 
There are currently several different interpretations of Peirce’s theory of 
perception.  Questions often arise as to apparent or real discrepancies in 
definitions of the percept and perceptual judgment, which are two of the central 
terms for Peirce’s theory.  Different and necessarily competing explanations have 
been offered to resolve these issues.  In other research I am working out how to 
understand the error of the competing accounts that have been offered for 
Peirce’s theory.  Here I will merely mention what I take to be the strength of my 
understanding of Peirce’s account compared with these others without spending 
much time on the competing accounts.  My main aim is to show that Peirce’s 
theory offers resolution to the problems that have been unsatisfactorily dealt with 
by the intentionalist theories discussed above.  Peirce’s theory also preserves 
what was so plausible about prior representationalist and sense-data views, 
namely that the content of perception is the objects viewed. 
Peirce’s various definitions of the percept have probably generated the 
most confusion in the literature, so quickly I want to establish why I take Peirce to 
be both clear and consistent.
                                           
77 Articles on Peirce’s theory of perception include but are not limited to Bernstein (1964), 
Rosenthal (1969, 1987, 2004), Hausman (1990), Almeder (1970), Haack (1994) and Ransdell 
(1979, 1997).  Chapters on Peirce’s theory of perception include but are not limited to “Perception 
and the Outward Clash” in Hookway (1985), “Truth and Reference” in Hookway (2000), and “The 
Epistemic Role of Perception” in Delaney (1993).  Certainly many others have discussed Peirce’s 
theory of perception, but the above have been helpful and central texts in my study and I am 
indebted to each of the authors for their insights.
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4.2. An important distinction in Peirce’s definition of the percept
In this section I will first analyze Bernstein (1969), Hausman (1990), and 
Rosenthal (1969, 2004).  Each of these authors finds Peirce’s terminology and 
various definitions at least to be problematic, to a lesser or greater degree, and, 
at most, to be contradictory.78  Although the general direction and conclusions of 
these essays on Peirce’s theory of perception has been profitable, suggesting 
that the discrepancies and their resolution have not led to complete 
misinterpretation, they have left Peirce’s theory in need of some resolution as 
each of their interpretations excludes the others.  I will offer yet another theory for 
Peirce’s different definitions of the components of perception, one that will agree 
with the general characteristics of the work already accomplished by these 
authors, but it will be substantially different in the resolution of the problematic 
area, and I hope to show Peirce to be more consistent and clear than has been 
previously stated in other works focusing on this issue.
                                           
78 Note these statements by these authors.  Bernstein (1964: 174-175) says, “But if we collected 
all of Peirce’s statements concerning percepts, we would find not only conflicting approaches but 
explicit contradictions.”  And later, “I suggest that the key for clearing up these ambiguities and 
apparent contradictions.…”  Also, Rosenthal (2004: 193) says, “what he says about perception is 
both incomplete and inconsistent,” and in (2004: 194) she says “But Peirce characterizes both the 
percept and the perceptual judgment in quite different, often contradictory ways.”  I do not cite 
these texts as indictments but only to show how Peirce scholars have wrestled with Peirce’s 
theory.  Each author listed attempts to resolve the discrepancies and apparent contradictions.  
What is interesting is that Hookway (1985) and Haack (1994) who I take to have worked out 
Peirce’s theory in a more satisfactory way do not mention the discrepancies in their work.  This 
suggests to me that so far the issue of Peirce’s different definitions has either been to some 
extent evaded or inadequately resolved.  Although I take the issue to be largely resolved in Haack 
and Hookway, even if unstated, I do not find the issue completely put to rest.  
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4.2.1. Bernstein conflates percept and percipuum79
Bernstein (1964) was one of the first to recognize that some account was 
needed for differing definitions in Peirce’s theory of perception.  His article was 
also important because it served as a reference for future scholarship on the 
topic.  In section four Bernstein notes two different types of definitions of the 
percept.  In one list he offers definitions that express a percept’s Secondness.  
These definitions show the percept to be anti-general, brutally forced, and 
singular.80  The second list defines the percept as a product of mental processes, 
of the nature of a sign, a mental construction, and the result of cognitive 
elaboration.81  The conclusion is inferred that the first list defines the percept as 
solely of the nature of Secondness while the second list contradicts this claim by 
defining the percept in terms of Thirdness.  Bernstein’s resolution of this apparent 
contradiction is to equate the second list of definitions with Peirce’s later term 
percipuum.  He says, “And when Peirce speaks of the percept as a sign which is 
not precise, as he does in the second series of quotations, it is the percept as 
interpreted (the percipuum) that he is speaking about.”82
First let me state where I agree with Bernstein.  The percipuum is 
minimally of the nature of Thirdness, and it is the percept immediately interpreted 
in a perceptual judgment.83  Also, Bernstein has correctly identified an important 
                                           
79 As far as I can tell, and according to Peirce himself, the term percipuum was invented by Peirce 
and ended with him except in research on his theory of perception.  It may be equated with what 
he called in 1901 a perceptual fact.  A perceptual fact or percipuum is the uniting of a percept 
(object viewed) and a judgment (classification or qualification of the object).  I think it is safe to 
substitute perceptual fact for percipuum but will continue to use percipuum where Peirce does.
80 Bernstein (1964: 174) specifically references CP 1.253, 2.146, 2.603, and 7.630.
81 Bernstein (1964: 174) specifically references CP 7.624, 4.542, 2.141, and 5.416.
82 Bernstein (1964: 176).
83 CP (7.643).
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distinction in Peirce’s definition of the percept.  But, more significantly I disagree 
that the percipuum can be used to reconcile the two lists Bernstein has 
juxtaposed.  Here are my contentions: First, if the percipuum completely replaced 
the use of percept in the second list, then it would be logical to infer that it was a 
substitute.  But in fact, Peirce refers to the percept in list two prior to and after his 
development of the percipuum in 1903.  This is clear even from Bernstein’s list.  
The percipuum is introduced in 1903, and Bernstein offers examples in list two 
from 1902 and 1905.  The conclusion is that Peirce wavered or was inconsistent, 
instead of showing a consistent development.  If this were the only option then 
the inference would seem more plausible, but if a better account can be found 
that retains both the diverging uses as well as preserving the consistency of 
Peirce’s mature thought then it should be preferred.  Second, Peirce does not, 
even when referring to the percept as mental, explicitly say that the percept is 
general or the nature of a Third. Peirce does not mean to suggest the category of 
Thirdness by these uses.  Instead he means to speak of the percept understood 
psychologically within the empiricist tradition and as analyzed by the science of 
psychology.  The exception will be when Peirce makes a semiotic analysis of a 
percept.  In this case the percept will be a sign, but not under the psychological 
distinction, and not when experienced phenomenologically in perception.
My claim is that the two lists do represent a distinction in Peirce’s 
definition of the percept, but not the one Bernstein identifies.  Bernstein thinks 
that Peirce has identified the percept both with his categories of Firstness and 
Secondness in the first list and Thirdness in the second list.  He also identifies 
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the trouble that this would cause for Peirce’s system by saying, “A great deal 
hinges on the answer.  If a percept is a sign (Third), then it might appear that 
Peirce, despite his protestations, is in agreement with the idealists who claim that 
there is nothing but Thirds.”84   Since the percipuum does have characteristics of 
thought and Thirdness, Bernstein tries to resolve the issue by the substitution of 
the term percipuum for the latter list.  But Peirce’s distinction actually involves the 
definition of the percept in his own system of categories, represented by the first 
list where the percept is of the nature of Secondness, with the percept as 
described by the science of psychology.  Not only does this solution make more 
sense of some other things Peirce says of the percept, but also it makes sense of 
what Peirce said about the science of psychology.  
4.2.2. Rosenthal multiplies Peirce’s account
Rosenthal (1969) and (2004) are in many ways similar papers.  They not 
only refer to Bernstein’s work on the percept, but they suggest that even 
perceptual judgment and percipuum have different meanings.  Since the different 
definitions of the percept have been mentioned above I will focus on the apparent 
discrepancies of perceptual judgment in Rosenthal’s work.  Rosenthal contends, 
“And conflicting claims abound in Peirce’s depiction of perceptual judgments.”85  
She divides definitions of perceptual judgment between those that state it to be 
infallible and those that state it to be fallible.  She also references a parallel 
distinction with reference to perceptual judgment expressing either reality or 
                                           
84 Bernstein (1964: 175).
85 Rosenthal (2004: 194-195).
79
appearance.86  Rosenthal’s solution to the distinction between definitions of 
percept and perceptual judgment is to also understand the percipuum as similarly 
distinguished in two different definitions.  Therefore, even though Peirce only 
uses three names he has in mind six distinct ideas by Rosenthal’s interpretation.  
She says, “it can be seen that Peirce uses both ‘percept’ and ‘perceptual 
judgment’ in a wide and narrow sense, corresponding to the two senses of the 
‘percipuum’….”87  
Rosenthal offers an interpretation of Peirce’s theory of perception that 
involves two levels of interpretation.  The first level of interpretation gives rise to 
the second level.  The first “narrow” level is characterized as “an analytic element 
of the perceptual experience” while the second or “wide” level is that which 
actually is experienced in perception.88  Finally, Rosenthal unites the two levels 
into a single process by asserting that the narrow level of interpretation gives rise 
to the higher level.
I take issue with Rosenthal’s resolution of conflicting definitions of Peirce’s 
terms in his theory of perception for two reasons: First, she constructs in some 
ways a very new account of Peirce’s theory of perception.  I do not consider this 
immediately wrong except that I believe there is a simpler resolution.  I hesitate 
to accept that Peirce, who took great care in his terminology, missed the levels of 
interpretation and need for a second and independent double of each one of his 
perceptual terms.  Second, I agree that there are different uses of percept.  But 
                                           
86 Rosenthal (2004: 195) references infallibility in CP 5.55, fallibility in CP 5.44, appearance in CP 
7.626, and reality in CP 7.636n.
87 Rosenthal (2004: 195).
88 Rosenthal (1969: 304).
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Rosenthal constructs a theory of perception uniting these uses under one 
process whereas it will be seen that Peirce considered them largely as 
independent uses, one phenomenologically correct and the other psychologically 
tentative.  Third, besides the multiplying of terms and stretching of the theory to 
include two levels of interpretation I consider the charge of incompleteness, 
inconsistency, and paradox to need more satisfactory resolution, one I hope to 
give by clear statements in Peirce’s work.  
4.2.3. Hausman and the second percept
Hausman (1990) offers an alternative to Bernstein’s resolution of the 
conflicting definitions of the percept.  Hausman does not equate Bernstein’s 
second list of definitions of the percept with Peirce’s introduction of the 
percipuum, but holds that “percept(1)” and “percept(2)” are both distinct from the 
percipuum.89  He offers this explanation:
What I think Peirce’s statements suggest is that there are percepts 
that are the consequence of the percipuum’s function in mediating 
percept(1) and judgment or interpretation.  Percept(2) is a 
consequence in being the object to which the judgment as a sign 
stands for an interpretant (Hausman 1990: 278).  
Hausman continues in his elaboration by placing percept(1) at the beginning and 
percept(2) at the end of the cognitive process of perception.  So, percept(1) is 
seen as precognitive whereas percept(2) is taken to be what we experience and 
“see” after interpretation has taken place.  Since the percipuum takes a 
mediating role between the percept and perceptual judgment Hausman contends 
                                           
89 Hausman (1990: 278).
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that the percipuum should be seen as the immediate object, percept(2) as the 
immediate interpretant, while percept(1) takes on the role of dynamic object.90
My criticism of Hausman’s interpretation of the juxtaposed accounts of the 
percept is similar to those offered previously.  First, if a simpler account is 
available that accords directly with Peirce’s definitions of the percept as defined 
both ways, then it should take precedence.  Second, Hausman multiplies entities 
by positing two distinct percepts involved in perception where Peirce has offered 
only one term, indicating one object, defined in two ways.
4.3. Summary of the problem and a solution
I will summarize these issues in this way.  In every interpretation of 
Peirce’s theory of perception analyzed above Peirce’s different definitions of the 
percept have led to either replacements of one definition of the percept with 
percipuum or multiplication of percepts and processes of perception.  Peirce 
explicitly offers neither of these options.  Instead what Peirce offers is a single 
account of perception with one percept defined in two different ways.  The 
resolution of these discrepancies will lead to a more coherent and clear picture of 
Peirce’s account of perception.  In order to resolve this confusion I will show that 
Peirce only posits one percept and defines it differently in different contexts.  
And, most importantly, when he is speaking of his theory of perception one 
definition is given clear precedence over the others.  In other words, only one list 
will suit his theory of perception while the other is left to the science of 
psychology to wrestle with.  The answer to the percept confusion lies in a 
distinction that Peirce makes consistently throughout his analysis.  I will show this 
                                           
90 Hausman (1990: 281-285).
82
distinction in several ways. Clearly defining what Peirce intended as his theory of 
perception is important in regards to Peirce studies.  It is also the groundwork for 
assessing its value and relevance.  The question will still remain as to whether 
Peirce was right or how his theory of perception may have advantage over 
contemporary forms of intentionalism or sense-data theories.  In order to assess 
his theory I will show how Peirce’s theory of perception deals with the two factors 
that intentionalism failed to make sense of; namely the need for content and 
cases from illusion.  On top of that, the common-sense aspect of Peirce’s theory 
retains more of our everyday intuition about what it means to perceive.
The essence of the distinction I am making is between two different 
accounts of perception.  The first account is Peirce’s account of the percept, 
while the second account is Peirce’s acknowledgement of the received 
psychology of his day coming down from the British empiricists.  Above, I have 
described this theory as the representationalist theory of perceptual experience 
that later was named the sense-data theory.  It is the theory that perception is 
indirect by perceiving intermediary objects that stand for the real objects in the 
world.  I have also discussed some of the reasons for rejecting the sense-data 
theory of perceptual experience.  While Peirce does not explicitly reject the 
sense-data theory by any argument he does explicitly state his unwillingness to 
understand perceptual experience in the sense-data fashion.  What I think is 
crucial is that he does not allow the psychological theory to change what he 
takes to be the phenomenological facts of perceptual experience.  
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In their account of Peirce’s theory of perception some philosophers have 
noted Peirce’s distinction between the normative and descriptive account of 
perception.  Rosenthal says that Peirce held a “radical rejection of reductionist 
theories of perception.”91  Hookway says that Peirce’s theory of perception 
illuminates the “phenomenology of visual experience.”92  Haack hints at the 
distinction I am leading up to in this statement, “ ‘The first impressions of sense’ 
as Peirce uses the phrase, refers not to percepts, but to neurological goings-on 
known to us only by way of sophisticated psychological theorizing.”93  And 
Delaney (1993) begins his analysis of the epistemic role of perception with an 
account of the “phenomenological features of perceptual experience.” This 
emphasis on the distinction between a phenomenology of perception and a 
scientific (psychological) distinction are mentioned mostly in passing in the 
secondary literature, and yet they were a recurrent theme in Peirce’s writings on 
perception.  Below is a list of quotes from Peirce’s writings.  Each one, I hope, 
will help to show that Peirce made an important distinction between his theory of 
perception and a psychological theory that if overlooked will make it difficult to 
resolve the apparent contradictions I have noted.
Now, this home is the parish of percepts.  It is not inside our skulls, 
either, but out in the open.  It is the external world that we directly 
perceive…  Our logically initial data are percepts.  Those percepts 
are undoubtedly purely psychical, altogether of the nature of 
thought…  But all that we find out afterwards (CP 8.144).
                                           
91 Rosenthal (1987: 33).
92 Hookway (2000: 131).
93 Haack (1994: 14).
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Here Peirce notes both that we directly perceive the external world and that we 
find out afterwards that it was all of the nature of thought.  He is referring to what 
the science of psychology infers about the percept.
You may adopt any theory that seems to you acceptable as to the 
psychological operations by which perceptual judgments are 
formed.  For our present purposes it makes no difference what that 
theory is (CP 5.54).
Here Peirce distinguishes the logical analysis from the theory of the 
psychological  operations that might bring about the judgment.  For his purposes 
the psychological aspect is not important.
In saying that perceptual judgments involve general elements I 
certainly never intended to be understood as enunciating any 
proposition in psychology.  For my principles absolutely debar me 
from making the least use of psychology in logic.  I am confined 
entirely to the unquestionable facts of everyday experience, 
together with what can be deduced from them (CP 5.157).
Here Peirce distinguishes between what the everyday facts of experience are 
and what psychology might infer.  In his theory of perception he is clear that the 
psychological theory is not important.
Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of my 
table, a yellow chair with a green cushion. That will be what 
psychologists term a “percept” (res percepta). They also frequently 
call it an “image.” With this term I shall pick no quarrel. Only one 
must be on one's guard against a false impression that it might 
insinuate. Namely, an “image” usually means something intended 
to represent,virtually professing to represent,something else, real 
or ideal. So understood, the word “image” would be a misnomer for 
a percept. The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any 
kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand 
for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for 
anything else, not "as" anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my 
soul and stands there in the doorway (CP 7.619).
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Here Peirce makes clear he does not accept any kind of sense-data or 
representationalist theory.  Also important is the instance where Peirce charges 
Pearson with confounding psychology and logic in.  He says, “Few things are 
more completely hidden from my observation than those hypothetical elements of 
thought which the psychologist finds reason to pronounce ‘immediate,’ in this 
sense.”94  Lastly I offer a quote where Peirce speaks directly of the psychologist’s 
account:
Since 1709, they [the psychologists] have been in possession of 
sufficient proof (as most of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its 
apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental 
processes, or at all events of processes for all intents and purposes 
mental, except that we are not directly aware of them; (CP 7.624).
And then there are Bernstein’s lists which you will remember separated the 
percept into definitions of singularity, anti-generality, and Secondness on one 
side and the product of mental process, nature of a cognition, a mental 
construction and the result of cognitive elaboration on the other.  Without 
understanding the distinction Peirce is making about psychological accounts of 
perception as opposed to his theory of perception his theory of perception would 
seem a very inconsistent and troublesome mixture of competing statements.
The important question is how to make sense of Peirce’s seemingly 
disparate definitions of the percept as either the object in the world or as an idea 
or mental entity.  I think that the different definitions can be labeled under the 
heading of either Peirce’s theory of perception proper or the seventeenth century 
psychological theory, which later became known as the representationalist theory 
                                           
94 CP (8.144).
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of perception.  What is interesting to me is that Peirce resists assigning the status 
of the percept to a mental object.  At the same time he acknowledges repeatedly 
that this is the standard psychological treatment of the perceptual object.  I intend 
to separate these two ways of defining the percept.  I think that Peirce’s theory of 
perception takes the object, as it is in the external world, to be a part of the 
content of perceptual experience along with a perceptual judgment.  He resists 
the representationalist theory in spite of the fact that it was the predominant 
psychological theory of his day.  
Today Peirce’s theory might be seen as acknowledging both the sub-
personal level as well as the experienced level of perception.  But what crucially 
distinguishes Peirce’s theory from sense-data account is his refusal to allow a 
psychological concept of representation to be mixed with a semiotic concept of 
representation.  For Peirce, whatever mental processes do, they make available 
a view of the objects in the world, not of representations or images of objects.  
This also distinguishes Peirce’s theory from the intentionalists who say that 
perceptual experience is intentional and that the representational content of an 
experience determines its phenomenology and the correctness conditions for the 
experience.  On Peirce’s account perception is an interaction between two 
objects, subject and object, which results in a view of the world for the subject.  
Whatever psychology might tell us about the process it does not affect the logical 
understanding of thought and representation.  For Peirce genuine representation 
does not even begin until after the perceptual judgment, which is still not full-
87
blown representation.  But perceptual judgment is a taking of the world to be a 
certain way and not a content that determines one’s perceptual experience.
I take this to resolve what I take to be unsatisfactory treatments of Peirce’s 
theory of perception by Bernstein, Rosenthal, and Hausman.  Each of the above 
quotes was taken from Peirce’s theory of perception, where it should now be 
clear he was careful to distinguish two ways of analyzing perception and its 
objects.  Valberg (2002) has called these two ways of understanding perception 
as the common sense story and the problematic reasoning.  He finds in them 
antinomy that cannot be resolved.  But Valberg had no classification of the 
sciences that might provide him with an insight into the way that a logic of the 
phenomenology of perception might govern the later science of psychology.  
Peirce also understood that the science of psychology did not appreciate the 
phenomenological position, but he steadfastly maintained that a science of 
psychology and the mental processes that made perception possible could not 
trump the primary phenomenological facts, that perception is brutal and forceful 
contact with a world and not some intermediaries.
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5. Peirce’s Theory of Perception
5.1. Peirce’s terms: percept, perceptual judgment, perceptual fact
5.1.1. Perceptual fact
In my discussions of the problems encountered in a study of Peirce’s 
theory of perception I have introduced three main terms: percept, perceptual 
judgment, and perceptual fact.  I will continue to use these terms even though at 
one point Peirce uses the term percipuum instead of perceptual fact.95  I will 
begin with the perceptual fact.  Peirce says, “Perhaps I might be permitted to 
invent the term percipuum to include both percept and perceptual judgment.”96  
He goes on to define it this way:
For this and other reasons, I propose to consider the percept as it is 
immediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the 
name of the “percipuum.” The percipuum, then, is what forces itself 
upon your acknowledgment, without any why or wherefore, so that 
if anybody asks you why you should regard it as appearing so and 
so, all you can say is, “I can't help it. That is how I see it” (CP
7.643).
So, for Peirce what is seen is the percept interpreted through a perceptual 
judgment.  We account for what we see by describing how we take things to be.  
This description indicates in propositional form the perceptual judgment.  These 
two contents together, the object-content of the percept and the information-
                                           
95 Peirce introduces the percipuum in his most detailed analysis of perception.  He does not say 
that the percipuum is equivalent with a perceptual fact.  But, the role that the two play is to me the 
same.  It is also clear that Peirce does not use the two terms simultaneously.  He uses perceptual 
fact much more in 1901 CP (5.568, 7.198) and 1902 CP (2.141, 2.144) and percipuum solely in 
his text on “Telepathy” in 1903 CP (7.629-7.677).  I think that the invention of the term percipuum 
represents a development in Peirce’s understanding of the phenomena he was describing.  But, 
since it falls out of use outside of the “Telepathy” manuscript it is unclear whether Peirce intended 
his analysis to be fully resolved.
96 CP (7.629).
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content of the perceptual judgment make up the perceptual fact.  It is crucial that 
Peirce understands both contents to be inseparable in the perceptual fact.  It is 
also crucial that the perceptual judgment is a cognitive taking of the object to be 
a certain way.  But, it is not, as the intentionalist would postulate, to be identified 
with some correctness conditions for the experience.  The percept is seen even 
as one judges it to be one way or another.  I will discuss this more below.  
Peirce makes the distinction between these two contents in this way: “If 
one sees, one cannot avoid the percept; and if one looks, one cannot avoid the 
perceptual judgment.”97 “But the moment we fix our minds upon it and think the 
least thing about the percept, it is the perceptual judgment that tells us what we 
so ‘perceive.’ ”98  In “seeing” the percept is there.  It is unavoidable.  It may be 
characterized as qualitative and forceful, but it lacks a meaning content.  In 
“looking” one interprets the seeing through the perceptual judgment.  So, for 
Peirce it seems that perception is a dual-content theory.  It involves an objectual 
and judgmental aspect.  Neither type of content plays an exclusive role.  Before 
analyzing how Peirce’s theory compares to the other major theories of perception 
I will define further these two contents of perceptual experience in Peirce’s 
theory.
5.1.2. Percept
The primary ways Peirce describes the percept are as qualitative and 
forceful.    These two characteristics come from his categories of Firstness and 
Secondness.  For Peirce, these are the primary characteristics of experience and 




existence.  This leads to a conception of the percept according to which it offers 
something positive, compels assent, and “it neither offers any reason for such 
acknowledgment nor makes any pretension to reasonableness.”99  And, as for 
any intentional character, “We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by 
testimony of the perceptual judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the 
reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in 
its totality.”100
Peirce’s characterization of perceptual content is in a significant way very 
similar to the sense-datist account and the contemporary intentionalist account.  
The sense-datists offered an account of object-content that relied heavily on the 
seventeenth century psychological account featured in Locke and Hume, and the 
intentionalists rejected this account and offered an information-content account of 
perceptual experience.  Peirce’s account of perceptual experience and its 
content includes an object-content, but one that does not speak or inform the 
perceiver about its status.  In this sense the perceptual object content is insistent 
and silent.101  It is not purely subjective as sense-data are, and it is not 
determined by a unique representational content as in the intentionalist account.
I think that this is a very important difference in Peirce’s view of perceptual 
experience.  As we shall see it is not the whole view, because Peirce also 
believed that experience is often if not always also characterized by judgment.  
But, before moving to that aspect of Peirce’s dual content theory I want to say a 





bit more on why it is important to maintain a separation between the object 
content and informational or intentional content.
Why could it be important to have in one’s theory about perceptual 
experience a concept of content that is dumb, silent, insistent, forceful, 
nonpropositional, an object that offers no reason or defense for its presence as 
Peirce says?  An example Peirce offers of what this object might be is this:
Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of 
my table, a yellow chair with a green cushion. That will be what 
psychologists term a “percept” (res percepta). They also frequently 
call it an “image.” With this term I shall pick no quarrel. Only one 
must be on one's guard against a false impression that it might 
insinuate. Namely, an “image” usually means something intended 
to represent,virtually professing to represent,something else, real 
or ideal. So understood, the word “image” would be a misnomer for 
a percept. The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any 
kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand 
for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for 
anything else, not “as” anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my 
soul and stands there in the doorway.
It is very insistent, for all its silence. It would be useless for 
me to attempt to pooh-pooh it, and say, “Oh come, I don't believe in 
the chair.” I am forced to confess that it appears. Not only does it 
appear, but it disturbs me, more or less. I cannot think the 
appearance is not there, nor dismiss it as I would a fancy. I can 
only get rid of it by an exertion of physical force.
It is a forceful thing. Yet it offers no reason, defense, nor 
excuse for its presence. It does not pretend to any right to be there. 
It silently forces itself upon me.
Such is the percept (CP 7.619-622).
Do you see, as I hope, how Peirce picks a quarrel both with our sense-datists 
and intentionalists?  His concept of the content of perceptual experience is much 
more “brutal” as he sometimes characterizes experience.  Experience is that 
which imposes, disrupts and forces itself upon the perceiver.  Neither is it a 
representative object nor a representational content.  It is a silent experience of 
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an object.  And, this for Peirce is just how visual experience can be described.  
From this perspective perceptual experience is not fundamentally internal or 
external, it is a brutal interaction between two objects that produces a seeing.  
The object of the seeing tells the perceiver nothing about itself, it is only to be 
found out or investigated.  Knowledge for Peirce is fundamentally a taking things 
to be so and so, the status of which is dependent on the effort made. But since 
Peirce conceives of experience as interaction with the world in a silent and 
forceful way there is no problem about how one’s senses deceive.  The senses 
do not play that role and truth and falsity are not values for experiences. Finally, 
on Peirce’s view of seeing objects in the world no questions of representation 
enter in to the account.  One simply has a view of the world that takes it to be a 
certain way.102  But there is a significant difference between seeing the facts 
open before one and representing things to be a certain way.  For Peirce, the 
perceptual judgment is a first premise of reasoning, but it itself is not a significant 
committed representation.  When someone commits herself to a representation 
they have reasons to support it.  They are responsible for its content.  
5.1.3. Perceptual judgment
So, if Peirce does not think of perceptual experience as fundamentally a 
knowing affair, then how does knowledge enter into the picture?  For Peirce, the 
possibility of knowledge begins with judgment.  He characterizes perceptual 
judgment this way:  It is fundamentally unlike the percept, it has propositional
                                           
102 Campbell (2002: 156) articulates a similar conclusion about his Relational View of experience.  
I am indebted to Campbell’s work for making a way clear to me for how Peirce’s view might be 
interpreted.  
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form, and it is the first premise of all our reasoning.  But it does share an 
important similarity with the percept in that it is fundamentally uncontrollable and 
uncriticizable.  For this reason Peirce puts the perceptual judgment within the 
content of his theory of perception.  We are, as McDowell says, but not in 
McDowell’s sense, saddled with content.  Peirce says, “In the first place, all our 
knowledge rests upon perceptual judgments.  These are necessarily veracious in 
greater or less degree according to the effort made.”103  
Like the intentionalists discussed above Peirce takes there to be an 
intentional content in perception.  But, unlike the intentionalists, Peirce maintains 
that any representational content of perceptual experience is fundamentally a 
judging affair.  It is a taking things to be a certain way that the silent experience 
of objects themselves do not offer.  The representational content is to be logically 
distinguished from the object content.  The first is an inferential affair, no matter 
how automatic and uncontrollable, and the second content is experiential in a 
sense of interaction that is noncognized.  The distinction between the 
intentionalist view and the Peircean view is important and worth elaborating.
As described previously, the intentionalist takes experiences to have 
correctness conditions.  The correctness conditions of experience are specified 
by the representational content of the experience.  Intentionalists often state that 
the world seems a certain way, or that experience represents the world to be a 
certain way.  When the representational content that specifies the correctness 
conditions for the experience matches the way the world actually is the 
experience is veridical.  I found two main problems with this notion of experience 
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as representational content.  First, there is no single way in which to represent 
the world in order to specify a unique representational content for a unique 
perceptual experience.  Representing things to be so and so is not something 
experience is equipped to do.  Experience does present the world, which enables 
the perceiver to indicate various objects in experience.  But indicating is not 
equal to symbolical representation.  In Peirce’s terminology, an index is not a 
fully genuine triadic sign.  Second, in addition to the inability to specify 
representational content that determines the experience, I found no evidence that 
experiencing was equivalent to representing things to be a certain way.  In other 
words, close attention to experience shows experience to be attention to objects 
and features of objects.  There is certainly attention to the facts, in the sense of 
seeing them, but this is not the same as specifying a representational content 
that determines the experience.  If the only way to get at the supposed 
representational content is to rely on the way I take the world in experience, then 
we can never have a representational content that is not equivalent to a 
perceptual judgment.  But the representational content was supposed to be the 
identification of the experience in its own right, which determined the correctness 
conditions for the experience, not a judgment based on the experience.  I 
concluded that I could find no way of making sense of this supposed 
representational content.
On Peirce’s account there is a declaring by the mind of what lies open to 
view.  But this is not a content that determines whether the phenomenological 
content is veridical or illusory; it is based on a phenomenological content already 
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before the mind.  The perceptual judgment is also not a representing of anything 
to be, but is better stated as a declaring or an indicating.  It simply puts in 
propositional form what the mind is attending to. This perceptual judgment and 
the content of it play a completely different role in perception than does the 
representational content of the intentionalist.  Instead of our senses deceiving us, 
it is our cognitive capacity, our initial judgment that may be either veridical or not.  
But this is an error of description or classification and not a correctness condition 
for the experience.
Peirce says this about the representational capacity of the perceptual 
experience.  In CP (7.628) the perceptual judgment is described as representing 
the percept, but not logically, and not as a copy.  It represents the percept 
“namely, as an index, or true symptom.”  There is no rational warrant for taking 
the perceptual judgment to be a true symbol of the percept.  It is by force and 
brute fact.  As an index Peirce says the perceptual judgment works this way, “In 
fact, the perceptual judgment which I have translated into ‘that chair is yellow’ 
would be more accurately represented thus: ‘[X] is yellow,’ a pointing index finger 
taking the place of the subject.”104  The subject, “that chair” is an indicator, a 
locator of the physical object, and does not play any conceptual role like 
providing meaning.  Perceptual judgment is merely an existential relation to the 
object.
This level of content is very different from a representational content that 
represents the correctness conditions for the experience. Peirce is specifying a
                                           
104 CP (7.635).
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rudimentary causal process of the mind that generates initial potential facts, 
which can only be determined to be true and false in relation to each other.  One 
is also reminded of McDowell’s thesis that the content of experience must be 
conceptual in order for experience to play a justificatory role in knowledge.  I do 
not think that experience on Peirce’s theory of perception can play the role that 
McDowell needs.  On Peirce’s view perception is less than rational.  The form it 
takes is not a conceptual one, full of meaning.  Knowledge of the world is not 
delivered through the senses.105  But the perceptual system does provide the 
perceiver with uncontrolled immediate access to the qualitatively rich world.
5.2.  How to tell the causal story without being a sense-datist.
The causal story was more than, but rooted in, the common scientific 
picture of how perceptual experience takes place.  The added element was that 
in order for experience to play a fundamentally explanatory role we needed an 
account that sustained the idea that experience is object dependent or relational.  
The sense-data theory argued that there must be intermediary mental objects 
between the perceiver and the real world.  This is why it was labeled an indirect 
realist theory of perception.  I also argued that the intentionalist view was unable 
to meet the relational requirement.  On the intentionalist theory, experience, 
defined as representing the world a certain way, could only be related to 
intentional objects.  On this account perception can misfire just like a belief.  The 
intentionalist considers her view direct realism because when the supposed 
                                           
105 It might be suggested that this statement is contrary to Peirce’s three cotary propositions 
found in Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction and The Nature of Meaning.  I do not think this is 
the case because perceptual processes lack two characteristics that are necessary for knowledge 
namely control and criticism.
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correctness conditions for an experience match the way the world is, the 
perceiver is in direct perceptual contact with the object.  But since the 
intentionalist accepts the common factor view, which says that experience has a 
similar content in either veridical or hallucinatory occasions experience cannot be 
defined primarily as a relation to the objects.  How well does Peirce meet the 
causal story requirement?
Peirce’s account of the percept as the object itself in view is a critical but 
common sense position that understands perception to be a process whereby we 
are forced into contact with the world. Peirce did not speculate on an alternative 
psychological theory that would support his phenomenological theory of 
perception.  In fact, on several occasions he states that the difference between 
his and the psychological view was resolvable or at least not a concern.106  
What I take to be important about Peirce’s way of dealing with the 
difference between the psychological theory and his phenomenological theory is 
that he distinguished between a logical and psychological use of representation.  
I think this is how to understand why he didn’t see the psychological theory as a 
threat to his theory of perception.  Peirce decided that whatever inferential 
knowledge could be found about the psychological or mental process that 
resulted in viewing the world it should not result in a falling away from having a 
view of the world.  The psychological sense of representation was not an issue 
for Peirce because he was convinced that what it resulted in was not a seeing of
                                           
106 Note CP (8.144, 1.253, 2.141, 5.55, 5.157, 7.619-7.624) for some illustrations of Peirce’s 
general dismissal of the appearance of a conflict between his account and the psychological 
account.
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representations in a sense-datist sense or an elimination of object content in an 
intentionalist sense.  He argued for a fundamentally common sense point.  
Whatever the psychological factors are, they result in the presence of a percept, 
an object of the world, not a mental object or a representational content.
Earlier I highlighted one example of a hypothesis that does justice to the 
empirical work being done in cognitive science while preserving the explanatory 
role of experience as fundamentally contact with objects in the world.  I take my 
example from Campbell (2002).107  Campbell describes a way of conceiving 
visual experience as if it were through a pane of glass or some other translucent 
substance.  The brain’s role in such a theory is to maintain translucence by being 
sensitive to all the details and nuances of the objects of visual experience.  On 
such a view visual experience is a view of the world.  The way to characterize 
such an experience is not to identify mental states but simply to put someone in 
the view that you are having.  As Campbell says, 
On this pictureon the relational viewyou simply cannot ask the 
question that is so pressing for a representationalist, namely: ‘How 
is the subject representing what she sees?’…Seeing the 
categorical object is not a matter of consciously representing it, so 
there is no question to be asked about the nature of the 
representation (Campbell 2002: 156).
It follows that there is nothing to ask about the nature of representation because 
no significant representation has begun in a logical sense, and the type of 
computational processing that goes on in say Marr (1982) is not the type of 
representational content the intentionalist was interested in.  On this translucence
                                           
107 For a full treatment of Campbell’s theory of perception see chapters 6 and 7 of Reference and 
Consciousness.
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hypothesis about visual experience there is a content of perceptual experience 
that is a view of the world.  This view is certainly brought about by significant 
causal factors that are investigated by the science of psychology.  But this does 
not justify the intentionalist contention that perceptual experience be considered 
as a mental state like belief, having a propositional content that determines the 
veridicality of the experience.  The advantage for the theory of perception that 
posits worldly objectual content characterized by qualitative and forceful silence 
is that the causal story about experience plays the intuitive explanatory role of 
there being contact with the world.  Perceptual experience such as seeing, which 
is the characteristic sensory modality I have been using, is a relation between 
perceiver and object.  
5.3. Overcoming the challenge of illusion
The main challenge to a view like Peirce’s comes from the traditional 
problem of hallucination or illusion.  Fortunately Peirce offers his own example of 
how to treat illusion and so I will begin by quoting these.  It should be noted that 
complete phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucinatory experiences are 
mostly a philosopher’s creation.  But Peirce does treat the problem of 
hallucination by postulating a series of tests.  The question though is how to deal 
with this logical possibility of indistinguishable hallucinatory experiences?  How 
do they alter or challenge a theory of perception?  They were a contributing 
motivation for sense-data, which are problematic in their own right.  They are a 
motivation for the common cause factor of the intentionalist also.  The 
intentionalist says that representational content determines phenomenology and 
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so two indistinguishable phenomenological experiences must have the same 
representational content.  The disjunctivist resists the common cause factor by 
saying that experience is most fundamentally characterized as perceptual or 
hallucinatory.  On this disjunctive conception of experience, no matter the 
phenomenological indistinguishability, there is nothing in common between 
perceptual experience and hallucination, intrinsically.  Experience is either/or.  
Our perceptual systems either puts us in touch phenomenologically with the 
external world, or it doesn’t.  But the disjuncts share no intrinsic common content.
Peirce does not deal with hallucination as much as with illusion.  For him, 
a hallucination, or where there was cause to doubt whether one was seeing, 
could be dealt with by a series of increasingly specific tests.  The first test is to 
will away the percept.  The second test is to inquire with a fellow perceiver as to 
whether they do or do not see such a percept.  The third test is to conduct an 
experiment that will test the percept’s capacity to accommodate the laws of 
nature.108  I think it is characteristic of Peirce to resist doubt where doubt is not 
real or heartfelt.  This is reflected in his way of dealing with hallucination.  
Hallucination is a natural phenomenon that can be tested when the situation is 
one where there is doubt.  But this possibility did not cause Peirce to postulate 
internal mental objects or content with correctness conditions that would 
determine the veridicality of the perception.  Crucially for Peirce representing only 
begins once it is needed.  One only begins thought, and therefore the use of 
representational content when in doubt.  But he would have never said that this
                                           
108 Peirce describes these tests in CP (1.142).
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was the standard situation for perceiving.  Perceiving is not a mode of thinking.  It 
is a mode of living that can be used for investigating or experimenting when a 
subject finds herself in a situation of doubt.109
Now I will discuss his example of illusion that supports his theory of 
perception that the percept, or phenomenological object content of perception, is 
not dependent on any representational content, but is affected by cognitive effort.
 The first example is this: “Sometimes when I have been seated in a 
railway-car that was stationary and another train has been slowly passing by, I 
have been vexed at the unreasonableness of its appearing to me that our train 
was moving and the other train was at rest.”110  He later concludes that once one 
knows the right trick one may change the perceptual fact, thereby righting the 
illusion.  The second illustration he uses comes from viewing “Schroeder’s Stairs” 
which is a two-dimensional line drawing like viewing a set of stairs at an angle.  
Initially it may appear as if one is viewing the stairs from the top, and it appears 
this way forcefully.  But, later and with some effort exerted on the percept one 
may come to view the stairs as from below.  
Doubtless frequent repetition of the experiment would give one 
complete control over it. You will thus have converted an 
uncontrollable percipuum into a controllable imagination by a brief 
process of education. It is one of the recognized difficulties of all 
psycho-physical measurement that the faculties rapidly become 
educated to an extraordinary degree (CP 7.647).
                                           
109 For more on a pragmatist understanding of the role of representation I direct the reader to the 
doubt/belief matrix of “The Fixation of Belief”.
110 CP (7.645).
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On Peirce’s account of these perceptual illusions the fault or error lies in the 
“education” of our faculties.  It is not the percept itself in view that is illusory but 
our taking the percept by judging it to be a case of the wrong situation.  The 
Schroeder’s Stairs appear qualitatively and forcefully.  Nothing about the object 
changes when they are viewed differently.  What changes is how I take the stairs 
to be either a case of viewing from below or a case of viewing from above.  But, 
there certainly remains a level of experience that involves the postulation of a 
silent interaction between the viewer and the world.  How might this differ from 
the account given by the intentionalist?
On the intentionalist’s account it is our senses that deceive us.  The 
intentionalist, viewing perceptual experience as a mental state, would specify 
some representational content that determined whether the perception was 
veridical or not.  But the Schroeder’s Stairs are precisely an example of 
perceptual experience where no one, single, representational, content could 
possibly be specified to determine whether the experience was correct.  The 
percept remains unchanged whether the perceiver takes it to be one way or 
another.  On Peirce’s account our senses are silent.  They merely give us a view 
of the world, as in the case of visual experience.  On the intentionalist’s account 
our senses are potentially in error by providing a representational content.   
Experience, in the sense of seeing a train in front of one or seeing a line in the 
shape of stairs on a piece of paper is silent.  It tells us nothing.  There is a 
relational interaction between the perceiver and the world.  “It simply knocks at 
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the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway.”111  The type of inference 
that takes place is usually automatic and uncontrollable, which is why Peirce 
associates this fundamental level of mindedness with perception.  But, 
nonetheless, it is not experience proper.  It is the first steps in the creation of 
premises that will be the foundation of reasoning.  
Peirce’s theory in a very important way is a return to the correct aspect of 
the sense-data theory.  Perceptual experience is objectual.  Perceptual judgment 
is a part of perceptual experience because the perceiver always views the world 
with attention to specific objects and qualities; the indexical relation represents 
this level of cognitive attention.  But perception, on Peirce’s account does not 
state or represent the way the world is.  I can note this way: “I see the dog.”  I 
can even indicate this way: “I see that there is a dog.”  But in neither case do I 
represent the way the world should be on any occasion for seeing a dog.  What 
is at stake is the way the world is and not the meaning of symbols.  We must find 
a way to understanding the difference between a situation where there is no 
question about what is the case, and therefore no need for an understanding, 
disambiguation, or resolution and the situation where these are needed as when 
I state something to be a certain way.  These are situations where we represent 
the world to be a certain way.  
5.4. Conclusion
I have argued that Peirce’s two-level theory about perceptual experience 
can deal with both the causal story that supports the explanatory value of 
experience as well as the problem of illusion in a satisfactory manner.  For these 
                                           
111 CP (7.619).
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reasons it is to be preferred to the sense-datist theory as well as the currently 
popular theory, intentionalism about perceptual experience.  But these factors 
have focused mostly on the absence of an object relation in perceptual 
experience in the intentionalist view and the presence of this content in Peirce’s 
view.  What Peirce provides is an account of experience that isolates the silent 
but forceful way in which we interact with the world.  And, when he includes 
judgment in his theory of perception, it is because of the way that it, too, is forced 
on the perceiver in most occasions, unless one exerts some effort otherwise. 
Isn’t this precisely why McDowell categorizes perceptual experience as 
conceptual?  Is it fair to criticize Peirce for not bridging the divide between mind 
and world through perceptual experience?
It is indeed for good reason that Peirce calls the part of perceptual 
experience that involves any intentional content judgmental.  For it is our learned 
habits that embody the way we take the world to be.  Let me formulate the 
challenge the way McDowell would.  McDowell thinks that in order for us to 
understand how experience can play an explanatory role in justifying beliefs 
about the world we must conceive it as conceptual.  We are in McDowell’s terms 
saddled with content.  But the problem I have associated with this view is that it 
views our sensory experience as “speaking” or providing the viewer with 
information about the environment instead of providing a view.  I think this is 
precisely the way McDowell would conceive of our sensory system within a 
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disenchanted naturalism, a naturalism he doesn’t think could provide reasons for 
beliefs.112
McDowell’s point is that if we want to preserve the idea that experience 
gives us reasons we must see experience as rationally organized so that there is 
continuity between our mode of belief (conceptual) and what our beliefs are 
about (experience as conceptual).  But there are two options.  Either McDowell is 
right to redefine experience as a part of the second nature of human beings or he 
presents one of those ultimatums “You’re either with us or against us” which 
misconstrue the situation as being one where either experience is conceptual or 
knowledge based on experience is not possible.  In my view, and I believe 
Peirce’s also, McDowell has misconstrued the situation.
Peirce says about perceptual judgment: First,  “It is plainly nothing but the 
extremest case of Abductive Judgments.”113  Second, “We thus come to the test 
of inconceivability as the only means of distinguishing between an abduction and 
a perceptual judgment.”114  Simply put, if it is conceivable that the judgment is not 
a true symptom, an index of the percept, then it is an abduction, a best guess or 
hypothesis.  But if it is inconceivable that things are not the way they appear in 
perception then it is a perceptual judgment.  In spite of the close similarity
between them, abductive and perceptual judgments are to be distinguished by 
the questionability or deniability of the judgment.  Where the abductive judgment 
might be conceived as a guess or a first step in inquiry, a perceptual judgment is
                                           




simply a classification of the phenomena based on habitualized ways of taking 
the world to be.  Perceptual judgment is much more a part of the sensory 
processing of visual experience without rational self-control.  Abduction however, 
is the birth of new inference.  But Peirce considers it perceptual judgment, 
judgment nonetheless, because it is a habitualized way of taking the world to be.  
The previously given example of Schroeder’s stairs exemplifies this way of 
dealing with perceptual judgment when Peirce describes the two ways of 
conceiving the matter.  He says:
Both, I beg you to remark, are general ways of classing the line, 
general classes under which the line is subsumed.  But the very 
decided preference of our perception for one mode of classing the 
percept shows that this classification is contained in the perceptual 
judgment (CP 5.183).
It is the crediting of classifying the phenomena, however uncritically or habitually, 
to perceptual judgment and not to experience that gives Peirce’s dual theory of 
perceptual experience the edge over intentionalism like McDowell’s.  For on 
McDowell’s view we are stuck in a rather awkward situation in describing how 
experience represents the world falsely.  He says, “Whether we like it or not, we 
have to rely on favors from the world: not just that it presents us with 
appearances… but that on occasion it actually is the way it appears to be.”115  
While it is to McDowell’s credit to take his theory to its logical conclusions, I think 
Peirce’s conception of the reason for the illusion places the error in the correct 
space.  
                                           
115 McDowell (1995: 886).
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Error in perceptual experience is not, as the intentionalists say, a matter of 
our senses deceiving us, in any strict sense, or of the world playing us false.  As 
Peirce says, our senses are silent and forceful.  Such is experience.  It is how we 
take, judge, classify the world to be that is the locus for error in perception.  So, 
while perceptual judgment is forceful, even uncontrollable, this should not lead us 
to posit it as a way to recognize any representational content that determines the 
correctness of the phenomenal presentation.  Peirce characterizes this type of 
experience in this way:
…we perceive what we are adjusted for interpreting, though it be 
far less perceptible than any express effort could enable us to 
perceive; while that, to the interpretation of which our adjustments 
are not fitted, we fail to perceive although it exceed in intensity what 
we should perceive with the utmost ease, if we cared at all for its 
interpretation (CP 5.185).
But this is not a way of saying that the representational content, truth evaluable 
content, determines the correctness of the perceptual experience.  McDowell, in 
his effort to preserve a common notion about experience, that thought should 
conform to experience, or that experience should be a reason for belief, has 
argued that we must conceive of perceptual experience as conceptual all the way 
down.  In the space of reasons there is no room for content that is not conceptual 
content.  On this account, for any particular perceptual experience there is some 
one way the world is organized that the experience must match in order to be 
correct.  When it is correct, experience provides reasons for belief.  Experience 
has a face value, a conceptual organization, or a way it represents the world that 
we may either take or leave.  On this way of conceiving experience, it is 
knowledge rich, and fundamentally identified with correctness conditions.
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On Peirce’s theory, perception is a natural mechanism providing a 
perceiver with contact with objects and features in the world.  Perception does 
not significantly represent the way the world is, but only indicates what is to be 
thought about or investigated.  Experience has two components: First, the 
perceiver is put in a qualitative and forced contact with reality.  This is a 
fundamental level of experience that is not constrained by conceptual capacities 
as in McDowell’s theory.  Second, attention to objects provides the perceiver with 
a symptom of the object, a true and undeniable symptom.  
While McDowell raises important questions about how to conceive mind-
world relations, I think it is his attention to the epistemological problem that skews 
his theory of perception.  Like the intentionalists as a whole, even though they 
postulate some level of representational content in experience, it is hard to flesh 
out just how experience could provide such a meaningful content.  The ways of 
representing the world do not match the experiences we have of the world.  
Significantly, Peirce saw representation as relying on experience and not defining 
it.  I think this is the primary advantage of his view.  Perceptual experience does 
not have correctness conditions outside of the correct functioning of the sensory 
systems.  But this is just a way of saying that to see the world one must be able 
to see, and to perceive the world one must be able to attend to various aspects 
of it.  Neither of these requires representational content as the intentionalist 
supposes.
I have not solved McDowell’s epistemological problem.  But that must be 
the research of another thesis.  What I have tried to do is to articulate a theory of 
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perceptual experience regardless of the epistemological problem.  Isn’t there 
reason to understand perceiving as a concept in and of itself?  Throughout I have 
considered only realist positions about perceptual experience, namely sense-
data theory, intentionalism, and disjunctivism.  I have also analyzed Peirce’s 
theory, which is in some sense a hybrid view, though in the hay-day of sense-
data theory Peirce resisted supposing the percept was an image or 
representation of any sort.  This is his fundamental insight.  I think this was the 
main mistake of sense-data theory that the intentionalists recognized.  But the 
intentionalist supposed using the concept of intentionality could solve the 
problem.  I have tried to show why experience cannot be conceived as 
representing the world to be any certain way.
I think Peirce’s theory offers the best alternative between the two.  Perception, on 
his account, is primarily phenomenological and causal.  He also maintains a 
significant distance between representing the world to be a certain way and 
perceiving the world to be a certain way.  This difference was exemplified by the 
difference of the indexical relation, or pointing, and representing which involves 
an interpretation.  There is much work to be done in the theory of perception that 
will enable an even clearer view of the relation between perceiver and the world.  
But as far as theories have carried us thus far, I think one along the lines of 
Peirce’s stands the best chance of being confirmed in later research.  I hope 
some of the reasons have become clear.
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